Nonalignment: Policy or Price?
In 1961, 25 states met at Belgrade and declared themselves nonaligned. A US State Department desk officer compares three of them. State A received $400 million in American development loans and $120 million in Soviet arms, voted with the United States in the UN General Assembly 38% of the time, and hosted no foreign bases. State B kept a British base, took Commonwealth aid, called itself nonaligned, and voted with the United States 71% of the time. State C nationalized foreign oil concessions, took Soviet credits, voted with the USSR 44% of the time, and joined no military pact. The officer writes: 'Nonalignment is not a policy; it is a price.' A Belgrade declaration calls it 'a positive policy of peace and independence.'
1. Using the three cases, assess the officer's claim that nonalignment is 'a price' rather than a policy. What pattern supports him, and what pattern undercuts him?
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Supporting the officer: all three states extracted resources from at least one patron, and their UN behavior tracks those patrons imperfectly but visibly - 38% and 71% agreement are not random. State B is the strongest evidence: it kept a British base, took Commonwealth aid, and voted with Washington most of the time, yet claimed the label. If the label costs nothing and purchases aid, it functions as a price signal rather than a commitment.
Undercutting him: State C nationalized concessions and refused military pacts - costly actions that antagonize the very governments whose aid a pure bargainer would court. And State A's refusal to host bases while accepting loans and arms from both sides is the classic posture of a state wanting aid without alliance.
So the data show both a price and a policy. The officer's error is treating a mixed pattern as a single motive - the same behavior can be bargaining in one state and principle in another, and the difference shows up in what each was willing to pay.
2. Distinguish nonalignment as refusal to join blocs from nonalignment as an active program. Which state best illustrates each, and why does the distinction matter for judging the Belgrade declaration?
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Negative nonalignment is non-participation: no military pacts, no foreign bases, formal abstention from bloc institutions. State A fits it cleanly; State B fits it only on paper, since a foreign base makes the refusal hollow.
Positive nonalignment is an active program: mediation between the blocs, support for national liberation movements, economic coordination among nonaligned states, and the claim that refusing blocs is itself a contribution to peace. State C best illustrates it - it took the costly actions (nationalizing concessions, refusing pacts) while accepting Soviet credits, even though its UN voting leaned toward Moscow.
The distinction matters because the Belgrade declaration is a claim about agency, not neutrality. It asserts that these states are shaping the contest rather than pricing their votes. Judging the declaration therefore requires asking what members did - mediated, organized, nationalized, refused - not merely what they declined to join.
3. What additional evidence would most efficiently tell you whether State A's nonalignment was strategic or merely tactical?
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The most efficient evidence is decision-level, not aggregate. Find episodes where American and Soviet preferences diverged and State A had something concrete at stake - a vote on a liberation movement, a vote on foreign bases, a vote on an aid resolution - and see which way it went and what the choice cost. Aggregate 38% agreement hides the cases that matter; the defections do the analytical work.
Then examine the aid itself. Was it fungible budget support, or tied to procurement from the donor? Arms with training missions and spare-part dependence create a decade-long relationship; development loans do not. If State A accepted Soviet spare parts, its future votes are partly mortgaged.
Finally, ask about domestic politics. Did the leadership publicize nonalignment to build legitimacy at home - giving the policy an internal constituency - or keep the Soviet arms quiet? If the state paid visible costs when the blocs disagreed, it is strategy. If it collected from both and voted with the stronger, it is a price.