The Crossbench That Wasn't Consulted
A Year 11 class models a lower house of 90 seats. The governing bloc holds 44 seats. A minor party holds 9 seats and has publicly committed to 'supply and confidence only' - it will vote with the government on budget bills but decides other legislation case by case. The remaining 37 seats belong to an opposition bloc that votes as a unit. A bill expanding compulsory preferential voting in local council elections is introduced. The government needs 46 votes to pass it. Two government backbenchers represent electorates where council elections are currently optional-preference and have told the whip they will cross the floor if the bill is not amended. The minor party's stated policy is that voting reform should be decided by referendum, not parliament.
1. Using the numbers, determine whether the bill can pass and identify which actors hold decisive leverage.
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The government starts with 44 votes and needs 46, so it is short by at least two before any defections. If the two backbenchers cross the floor, the effective government tally falls to 42, widening the gap to four.
The opposition bloc of 37 cannot reach 46 alone, so it cannot pass the bill but can block it if it stays united. The minor party's 9 votes are therefore decisive: 44 + 9 = 53 clears the threshold comfortably, and 42 + 9 = 51 also clears it.
But the minor party has pre-committed to supply and confidence only, and its policy position (a referendum) conflicts with the bill. Leverage sits with the minor party, which can extract concessions, and with the two backbenchers, who can credibly threaten to reduce the government's floor. The opposition's leverage is purely negative - it can deny numbers but cannot construct a majority. The judgement the exam rewards is distinguishing formal numbers from behavioural commitments: a bloc that votes as a unit is a reliable count, whereas a party with a stated doctrine is not.
2. The government offers the minor party a binding commitment to hold a plebiscite after passage. Explain why this may not resolve the deadlock, referring to the distinction between a plebiscite and a referendum.
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A plebiscite is a national vote on a question that does not alter the Constitution; its result is advisory and does not bind parliament. A referendum under section 128 is a formal process to change the Constitution, requiring a double majority - a national majority and majorities in a majority of states.
The minor party's stated position is that voting reform 'should be decided by referendum'. If the reform concerns local council elections, it is a matter of ordinary legislation, not constitutional amendment, so a referendum is not the correct mechanism and may not be available at all. Offering a plebiscite substitutes an advisory popular vote for a binding one.
So the offer may fail on two grounds: it does not match the minor party's stated doctrine (which specifies a referendum), and even a successful plebiscite would not legally compel the parliament to enact anything. The minor party could accept it as a face-saving device or reject it as a category error. A strong answer notes that the government could instead amend the bill to make preferential voting optional in the two affected council areas, splitting the backbench threat from the crossbench demand.
3. Suppose the bill passes the lower house but the upper house, elected by proportional representation, rejects it. Explain how the composition method of the upper house shapes this outcome.
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Proportional representation tends to produce a chamber where no single party holds a majority, because seats are allocated in rough proportion to vote share across a large electorate. That means the governing bloc's 44-seat dominance in single-member lower house seats does not translate into control of the upper house.
Minor parties and independents are over-represented relative to single-member contests, so a party with 9 lower house seats may hold a larger share upstairs. The bill's fate then depends on the same crossbench logic as before, but with different arithmetic and different incentives: upper house members face longer terms and statewide constituencies, so they are less exposed to local council preferences and more exposed to their party's national brand.
The judgement point is that bicameralism plus PR creates a second veto player with a different electoral base. A bill that squeaks through the lower house on local deals may fail upstairs where those deals are irrelevant. Students should avoid treating 'the government' as a single actor controlling both chambers.