A Referendum That Fails on the Double Majority
A proposal to amend the Commonwealth Constitution to recognise local government in a new section is put to a referendum. National results: 54% Yes, 46% No. State-by-state Yes percentages: State P 58%, State Q 61%, State R 55%, State S 49%, State T 47%, State U 52%. The two mainland territories recorded 63% and 59% Yes. Turnout was 91% nationally. The government had bipartisan support for the proposal, spent heavily on advertising, and pointed to the territories' strong Yes vote as evidence of public endorsement. A backbencher argues that because a majority of voters nationally supported the change, blocking it would be undemocratic.
1. Determine whether the referendum succeeds, showing the counting rule and the arithmetic.
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It fails. Section 128 requires a double majority: a majority of all electors voting nationwide, and a majority of electors voting in a majority of the states. Nationally, 54% Yes satisfies the first limb. On the second limb there are six states, so a majority is four. Yes carries P (58%), Q (61%), R (55%) and U (52%) - four states. S (49%) and T (47%) vote No. Four of six is a majority of states, so on these figures the referendum would in fact succeed. The trap is the territories: territory votes count in the national total but do not count toward the state majority, because s 128 speaks of 'a majority of the States'. A candidate who added the territories to the state count would reach six of eight 'units' and misdescribe the rule; a candidate who dismissed the referendum because two states said No would also be wrong, since the requirement is a majority of states, not all states. Correct answer: carried, 54% nationally and 4 of 6 states.
2. Evaluate the backbencher's claim that a national majority should be sufficient, and explain what the double majority is designed to protect.
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The claim is a serious democratic argument but it misreads the design. Section 128 deliberately weights the states because federation was a compact between colonies that surrendered specified powers on condition they retained a guaranteed voice in constitutional change. A national majority alone would let the two or three most populous states amend the compact over the objections of smaller states, converting a federal union into a unitary majority. The double majority is not a denial of democracy; it is a supermajority rule of the kind used in many federations, and it operates as a protective device for regional interests. Against the backbencher: (1) the referendum already required and received a national majority, so no national majority was overridden in this case; (2) 'undemocratic' should be reserved for rules that entrench power without consent, whereas s 128 entrenches a distribution of power that the states agreed to; (3) the territories' strong Yes vote is relevant to the national total but cannot substitute for state majorities, because the territories are creatures of Commonwealth statute, not partners to the compact. The strongest counter is that s 128 makes beneficial change very hard, which is a real cost - but that is an argument for reform of the mechanism, not for ignoring it.