Fatigue and Crew Shortage on a Morning Charter
A small charter company operates a 12 m vessel with one operator and two crew for up to 12 passengers. On Friday the operator was on duty from 05:30 to 18:30, then did maintenance and paperwork until 21:00. He slept about five hours and reports feeling groggy. Saturday's trip is a 06:00 departure, eight hours on the water, with a forecast of 15 to 20 knots and 1 m chop. One crew member calls in sick at 05:00; no replacement is available. The owner says the charter is fully booked and the vessel can legally sail with one crew. The operator has caffeine and says he will be fine. The route includes a narrow, current-swept channel and two stops with passenger boarding. The vessel has a written safety procedure but no fatigue policy. The operator holds SVOP and MED A3.
1. Assess the fatigue and crewing risk using the specific facts.
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The risk is high. The operator was on duty for 13 hours, then worked about 2.5 hours more, slept roughly five hours, and is starting again at 06:00. He reports grogginess, which is a symptom of insufficient recovery sleep, not a personality issue. The day adds eight hours on the water, a narrow current-swept channel, two passenger boardings, and one crew instead of two. Fatigue reduces vigilance, reaction time, and the quality of decisions in exactly the situations that require them: traffic, current, and boarding. The owner's statement that the vessel can legally sail with one crew may describe a minimum manning figure, but legal minimum does not equal safe manning. The operator should verify the manning document rather than accept the claim. Caffeine does not restore performance after a short sleep; it may only mask the problem briefly.
2. What options and mitigation would you consider, and what decision would you make?
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Options include cancelling, delaying until a rested replacement crew member is available, shortening the trip to a sheltered route, reducing the passenger load, or adding an experienced deckhand. Adding a passenger who is not trained is not a substitute for crew. I would not sail with one crew and a groggy operator into a narrow, current-swept channel with two boarding stops. If the trip can be delayed until the operator has slept and a second crew member is available, that is the preferred option. If not, cancel. If a much shorter, sheltered trip is chosen, it should still have clear roles, conservative speed, and no attempt to meet the original schedule. The operator must be honest about his fitness for duty; the owner cannot override that judgment. The decision should be made before passengers board, not after departure.
3. What should be recorded and communicated, and what follow-up is needed?
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Record the previous day's duty times, the maintenance period, estimated sleep, the operator's reported condition, the crew shortage, the forecast, the route risk, the decision, and who was notified. Inform the owner and the booked passengers promptly, with the reason and the alternative. If the trip is cancelled, record that no unsafe departure occurred. Follow-up should include a written fatigue-management procedure covering minimum rest before duty, maximum duty periods, backup crewing, and a no-blame reporting route for tired crew. The company should also review why maintenance was scheduled after a full duty day and why no replacement crew was available. A single cancellation is not the end of the issue; the same schedule will recur unless the planning changes.