Network Security Fundamentals
This domain tests defensive fundamentals: the CIA triad, AAA, threat recognition, control types, filtering logic, VPN building blocks and Layer 2 hardening. Items are often scenario-based, asking what a control prevents or where an ACL belongs.
Principles and controls
- Confidentiality, integrity, availability; identification, authentication, authorization, accounting.
- Least privilege, defense in depth, separation of duties, zero trust (verify explicitly, assume breach).
- Controls are administrative (policy, training), technical (ACL, encryption, 802.1X) or physical (locks, cameras), and preventive, detective (IDS, logs) or corrective (restore, patch).
Threats to recognise
- Spoofing: IP, MAC, ARP poisoning (on-path), DNS cache poisoning, rogue DHCP server.
- DoS/DDoS: SYN flood, UDP amplification, volumetric attacks.
- VLAN hopping via switch spoofing (DTP) or double tagging; DHCP starvation exhausting the pool.
- Rogue AP and evil twin, deauthentication attacks, phishing and social engineering, credential stuffing.
Enforcement tools
- Stateless ACLs filter on the 5-tuple; stateful firewalls track sessions; NGFWs add application inspection. A DMZ hosts public-facing services.
- ACL evaluation is top-down, first match wins, with an implicit deny at the end. Standard ACLs match source only and belong near the destination; extended ACLs belong near the source.
- IPsec: AH provides integrity and authentication only; ESP adds confidentiality. IKE negotiates security associations; tunnel mode protects site-to-site traffic.
- Layer 2 hardening: port security with sticky MACs (protect drops silently, restrict logs, shutdown err-disables), DHCP snooping, dynamic ARP inspection, BPDU guard, unused ports shut down, native VLAN changed.
- Crypto: symmetric AES for bulk data, asymmetric RSA/ECDSA for key exchange and signatures, SHA-256/HMAC for integrity, PKI certificates for trust.
Worked example
Requirement: deny HTTPS from 192.168.10.0/24 to 10.1.1.10 but allow everything else. On the router interface facing 192.168.10.0/24, inbound:
access-list 100 deny tcp 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.1.1.10 eq 443
access-list 100 permit ip any any
Order matters: if the permit came first, every packet would match it and the deny would never be evaluated. Omitting the final permit would trigger the implicit deny and black-hole all traffic from that subnet.
Traps
- Assuming AH encrypts payloads; only ESP does.
- Placing a standard ACL near the source, where it blocks more traffic than intended.
- Thinking port security protect mode sends alerts; it drops frames silently.
- Believing NAT or a hidden SSID is a security control.
- Confusing hashing (one-way integrity) with encryption (reversible with a key).