The Miscalendared Answer and the Deleted Reminder
Grace represents Ridgeline Mechanical in a Denver District Court breach-of-contract case. Plaintiff serves the complaint on Ridgeline by mail on March 1. Grace’s calendaring software calculates the answer deadline as April 1 because it adds 30 days instead of the correct period. In fact, the answer is due in late March. On March 20, plaintiff’s counsel emails Grace: “Just confirming you know the answer is due next week.” Grace reads the email, realizes the software may be wrong, but does not correct the calendar. She deletes the email. On April 3, plaintiff moves for default judgment. Grace files a motion to set aside the default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b), arguing excusable neglect because her software “had a bug.” She does not mention the March 20 email. The court asks whether Grace’s conduct affects the relief and whether she has professional obligations to disclose the email.
1. Compute the correct answer deadline and explain the civil-procedure error. Why is April 1 wrong?
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Under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant generally must file an answer within 21 days after service of the complaint. When service is by mail, C.R.C.P. 6(e) adds three days to the period. Counting from March 1, 21 days ends on March 22, and the three-day mail extension makes the answer due March 25, subject to the rule that if the last day falls on a weekend or holiday, the period runs to the next business day. April 1 is therefore too late.
Grace’s software applied a 30-day period, which is not the answer deadline for this case. A calendaring error is not a legal excuse by itself; lawyers are expected to know the rules and to verify software-generated deadlines. The March 20 email from opposing counsel was an additional warning that the deadline was approaching. Grace’s failure to correct the calendar after reading that email is more serious than a simple software glitch. The error is not merely a computational mistake; it is a failure of diligence under Colo. RPC 1.3.
2. What standard governs Grace’s motion to set aside the default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b), and how does the deleted email affect the analysis?
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C.R.C.P. 55(c) allows the court to set aside a default for good cause. Once a default judgment has entered, C.R.C.P. 60(b) supplies the grounds, including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or other reason justifying relief. Colorado courts favor resolving cases on the merits, but the moving party must show a meritorious defense and a reasonable explanation for the default. Attorney carelessness is generally not “excusable neglect” unless there is a substantial justification beyond ordinary negligence.
The deleted email cuts strongly against Grace. It shows that she had actual notice that the deadline was near, that she suspected her calendar was wrong, and that she chose not to act. That is not an excusable software bug; it is a conscious decision to ignore a warning. If Grace argues that she never received notice or that the default was solely a computer error, the email contradicts her. The court may still set aside the default if Ridgeline has a meritorious defense and the prejudice to plaintiff is minimal, but the explanation for the default is weak. The email also raises a candor issue: Grace cannot affirmatively mislead the court about the reason for the delay.
3. Does Grace have a professional obligation to disclose the March 20 email? What discipline or other consequences are realistic?
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Yes. Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) prohibits knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal and requires correction of a false statement previously made. If Grace tells the court that the default was caused solely by a software bug, while omitting that she received and deleted a reminder email, she creates a misleading impression. Colo. RPC 8.4(c) prohibits dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. She should disclose the email and explain her failure to act. The disclosure may hurt her motion, but candor is not optional.
Other consequences include a Rule 1.3 diligence violation, possible sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 or the court’s inherent authority, a malpractice exposure to Ridgeline, and an OARC complaint. Discipline could range from a private admonition or public censure to suspension if the court finds that she knowingly misled it. Mitigating factors would include prompt correction, cooperation, and remedial calendaring changes; aggravating factors include deleting the email and failing to correct the false impression.