Threat Intelligence Types and Sources
This domain tests source selection and source evaluation: which discipline answers which question, how reliable a source is, and how corroboration affects the confidence you may state.
Source disciplines
- OSINT - vendor blogs, CERT advisories, news, social media, code repositories, certificate transparency, scanning data.
- HUMINT - human sources: ISAC peers, incident responders, insiders, covert contacts.
- SIGINT/COMINT - intercepted communications; almost always government-held.
- TECHINT - captured malware, forensic artefacts, infrastructure scanning, sandbox output.
- IMINT/GEOINT, MASINT - imagery, geospatial and measurement signatures.
- Internal telemetry - EDR, DNS, proxy, identity logs, honeypots. Highest relevance to you, often least exploited.
Feed categories and selection criteria
Commercial (SLA-backed, curated), open/free (variable quality, high volume), community/ISAC/CERT, dark-web and paste monitoring, malware research, government advisories. Evaluate each on coverage of your sectors and regions, latency, false positive rate, machine-readability and API support, licensing and redistribution rights, and provenance.
Admiralty ratings
Source reliability A–F: A completely reliable, B usually reliable, C fairly reliable, D not usually reliable, E unreliable, F cannot be judged. Information credibility 1–6: 1 confirmed, 2 probably true, 3 possibly true, 4 doubtful, 5 improbable, 6 cannot be judged. Combine as "B2". Independence is decisive: a dozen outlets citing one vendor blog is one source, not twelve.
Worked example
A vendor blog announces a new loader "in the wild"; internal telemetry shows the same loader's hash executing twice last week. The blog is B2 - a single commercial source, unconfirmed by a second party. The internal telemetry is A1 for the fact that it executed, but says nothing about campaign intent or scope. Reasoning: internal evidence is more credible on the factual question, the external source supplies context, and neither alone supports a strategic judgement. The product states both, rates each separately, and gives moderate confidence.
Traps that cost marks
- Counting syndicated copies as corroboration.
- Assuming free means bad and commercial means good; check currency and regional coverage.
- Treating a sandbox verdict as finished analysis.
- Ignoring internal telemetry because it does not look like "intelligence".