Speed bonus in a technical support call centre
CallCentre CY handles technical support for three telecom clients with 18 agents. Annual staff turnover is 28%, absenteeism 9%, and average handling time has risen from 6.5 to 8.2 minutes; first-contact resolution fell from 78% to 66%. Agents are paid a fixed €1,250 monthly salary plus a €100 attendance bonus. The operations director proposes replacing the attendance bonus with an individual bonus of up to €250 for speed, funded by a €60,000 annual pool. The union argues targets are arbitrary and that the bonus will reward rushed calls. Exit interviews mention lack of career progress, repetitive work and unfair scheduling. The company has one team leader for 18 agents and no formal coaching.
1. Diagnose the motivation and performance problems. Use at least two motivation theories and explain why the proposed speed bonus may fail.
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Herzberg: pay and the attendance bonus are hygiene factors; they prevent dissatisfaction but do not motivate. Exit interviews cite lack of career progress, repetitive work and unfair scheduling - motivators are absent. Vroom: expectancy is weak because targets are arbitrary and systems are slow; instrumentality is uncertain because only top performers receive €250; valence may be low relative to stress. Adams: agents will compare their bonus with team leaders' pay and with colleagues who receive easier calls; perceived inequity will reduce effort. Job characteristics: autonomy, feedback and task variety are low.
A speed bonus rewards quantity, so agents may rush calls, shorten handling time and reduce first-contact resolution, shifting cost to callbacks and client complaints. The €60,000 pool is about €278 per agent per month if fully distributed, but an individual €250 maximum means many receive little.
Judgement: fix base fairness, scheduling, coaching and career paths first. Use a team and quality-weighted bonus rather than speed alone.
2. Design a costed reward and job redesign plan within €60,000 per year. Include non-financial elements.
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- Base pay review: €20,000 to bring the lowest pay to market median and remove the arbitrary attendance bonus.
- Team quality bonus: €25,000 pool paid quarterly on first-contact resolution, customer satisfaction and schedule adherence, not speed alone.
- Career ladder: €8,000 for two senior agent roles with coaching duties, creating visible progress.
- Coaching and span of control: €5,000 for team-leader training and four hours per week of coaching; appoint two senior agents to reduce the span from 18 to 9.
- Scheduling: €2,000 for roster software or a roster committee; publish shifts two weeks ahead.
Non-financial elements: daily huddles, call listening, recognition, involvement in target setting and clearer client rotation. Total: €60,000. Metrics: turnover, absenteeism, first-contact resolution, average handling time and customer satisfaction.
Judgement: a team-based quality bonus reduces the risk of undermining cooperation. Evaluate after six months and adjust weights using actual data, not arbitrary targets.
3. How should management handle union opposition and implement the change?
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Consult the union before announcing the scheme. Share the performance data - turnover, absenteeism, first-contact resolution and callback cost - and explain that speed alone is damaging. Negotiate the targets and the weighting of quality versus quantity. Offer a pilot of three months with a joint review, and guarantee that no agent loses base pay during the pilot. Establish a grievance route for disputed targets and publish bonus calculations so they are transparent.
Train team leaders in coaching and fair call allocation; rotate difficult clients so that bonus differences are not caused by call mix. Communicate individually, not only through the union. Judgement: the union's objection is substantively correct - arbitrary speed targets would reward rushed calls. A negotiated, quality-weighted scheme is more likely to improve first-contact resolution and reduce turnover than imposing the director's proposal.