The Knife Call at 2:14 a.m.
At 2:14 a.m., Officers Reyes and Cole respond to a domestic disturbance. The caller says her brother, Marcus, 27, is drunk, has a 10-inch kitchen knife, and is 'waving it around' in the driveway. On arrival, officers see Marcus standing 22 feet from the patrol car, holding the knife at his side, yelling that he will 'cut anyone who comes near.' He does not advance. No one else is visible. The officers have handguns, a patrol rifle, a Taser rated effective to 25 feet, and a ballistic shield in the trunk. Backup is four minutes away. Department policy permits deadly force only when the officer has probable cause to believe the person poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person. Marcus refuses commands to drop the knife and repeatedly steps one foot forward and back. A neighbor's porch light reveals a child's bicycle in the driveway.
1. Apply the constitutional standard for deadly force to the facts as they stood when officers arrived. Identify which Graham factors cut for and against using deadly force.
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The governing standard is objective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham v. Connor lists severity of the crime, immediate threat, and active resistance or flight. Severity: a domestic disturbance involving a knife is serious and violent. Immediate threat: Marcus has a lethal weapon, is intoxicated, and is yelling threats, but he is 22 feet away, has not advanced, and officers have cover and a shield. Active resistance: he refuses commands, but verbal noncompliance alone is not an immediate threat. Flight: none.
Deadly force is therefore not justified at the moment of arrival because a reasonable officer would not have probable cause to believe Marcus posed an imminent threat of death or serious injury; distance, cover, and the availability of less-lethal options matter. The officers may point weapons, issue commands, and hold containment. They may not fire merely because he has a knife. If he advances rapidly and closes distance, the calculus changes, but the threat must be immediate, not speculative.
2. Write the tactical plan for the next four minutes that a supervisor should direct, explaining how each step reduces legal risk.
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First, use the patrol car as cover and keep both officers behind it; do not approach. Second, designate a less-lethal officer with the Taser and a lethal-cover officer, with clear roles, because a Taser at 22 feet is within range but requires a second officer ready if it fails. Third, retrieve the ballistic shield if it can be done without exposing an officer. Fourth, give calm, repeated, single-purpose commands: 'Drop the knife, Marcus; we will not come closer.' Fifth, contain the perimeter and evacuate nearby residents, including the child whose bicycle is visible. Sixth, request a crisis negotiator and a supervisor, and ask dispatch for any mental-health history. Each step reduces legal risk by creating time and distance, preserving less-lethal options, and documenting that deadly force was not immediately necessary. Do not close distance to 'effect arrest' without a plan. If Marcus advances, the less-lethal officer deploys under lethal cover, and the lethal-cover officer fires only if the Taser fails and Marcus poses an imminent threat. The plan must be announced and recorded.
3. Assume Marcus later walks eight feet toward the officers and is shot. What facts may a review board consider, and what facts are legally irrelevant to the objective-reasonableness inquiry?
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The board may consider the facts known to the officer at the moment of the shooting: Marcus's distance when he began moving, his speed, whether he raised the knife, the commands given, the presence of cover, the availability of the Taser, and whether the officers could retreat safely. It may consider the number of shots and whether they ceased when the threat ended. It may not consider hindsight facts unknown to the officer, such as the knife being unloaded or Marcus's later statement that he did not intend to hurt anyone. It may not rely on the officer's subjective fear alone, although the officer's perception is relevant if objectively reasonable. Department policy is not the constitutional test, but it may be evidence of training and reasonableness. The suspect's prior record is irrelevant unless the officer knew it and it affected the threat assessment. The board should ask whether a reasonable officer, facing the same split-second facts, would have used deadly force, and whether a warning was feasible.