Anecdote, System, and the Redefinition Move
Historian Lena Ortiz argues that the 1887 Dawes Act’s effects on Native American land tenure cannot be measured solely by acres lost. She notes that some allotments were leased rather than sold, and that oral histories record continued use of ceded lands for gathering. Critics reply that her evidence is anecdotal and cannot support a systemic claim. Ortiz counters that her point is not to quantify but to redefine what counts as dispossession. A question asks: The critics and Ortiz disagree primarily over (A) whether the Dawes Act was harmful (B) what kinds of evidence can establish a claim about dispossession (C) the exact number of acres lost (D) whether oral histories are reliable in general (E) whether leasing is economically beneficial. A test-taker chooses D because the critics call the evidence anecdotal.
1. Which choice is best, and why is D a scope error?
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B. The critics attack Ortiz’s evidence as anecdotal and insufficient for a systemic claim; Ortiz replies by changing the standard of proof-she is not trying to quantify but to redefine dispossession. That is a disagreement about what evidence can establish the claim. D is a scope error: the critics question whether oral histories can support a systemic claim, not whether oral histories are reliable in general. A is too broad; C is the metric Ortiz explicitly rejects; E is not at issue.
2. If Ortiz had replied, 'My evidence is anecdotal, but it is representative of many communities,' how would the function of her reply change?
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It would move her onto the critics’ ground: she would be claiming that anecdotal evidence can be generalized, rather than rejecting the demand for quantification. That might answer the critics on their own terms, but it would abandon her original redefinition move. The original counter is stronger as a reframing; the revised reply invites a debate about sampling and representativeness.