Late Removal and Personal Jurisdiction in a Guam Supply Dispute
Pacific Rim Fixtures, a Guam LLC, sues Manila-based Harbor Supply Ltd. in the Superior Court of Guam for breach of a $180,000 contract to deliver custom millwork. The contract selects Guam law but has no forum-selection clause. Harbor is served on March 3. Its 30-day answer period expires, and it does nothing. On April 20-48 days after service-Harbor files a notice of removal to the District Court of Guam and, in the same filing, moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Harbor has no Guam office, but a commissioned sales agent visits quarterly, its website accepts Guam orders, and it shipped $400,000 of goods into Guam over three years. Plaintiff moves to remand and argues Harbor waived personal jurisdiction by removing. The Superior Court clerk has already set a status hearing.
1. Is Harbor's removal timely, and what is the consequence?
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Timeliness. Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which requires a notice of removal within 30 days after service of the initial pleading. Harbor was served March 3; the 30th day was April 2. The April 20 notice is 48 days after service and 18 days late. The District Court of Guam has federal-question and diversity jurisdiction in appropriate cases, but a procedurally late removal is not cured by the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. If Pacific files its motion to remand within 30 days after removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) requires remand for a defect in removal procedure. The court should not reach the merits of personal jurisdiction unless it first decides some independent basis to retain the case. The status hearing in Superior Court does not extend the removal deadline.
2. Did Harbor waive personal jurisdiction by removing and moving to dismiss?
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Waiver. Removal alone does not waive a personal-jurisdiction defense. A defendant may remove and then raise lack of personal jurisdiction in its first Rule 12 response. Harbor did raise it in the same filing as the notice of removal, so it preserved the defense in federal court. But preservation does not make the removal timely. If the case is remanded, Harbor must raise the defense under Guam practice in the Superior Court; a removed case that is remanded returns to the state-court posture. The practical lesson is that Harbor's jurisdictional motion is not a cure for the late notice.
3. Assuming the District Court reaches minimum contacts, analyze whether Guam can exercise specific jurisdiction over Harbor.
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Minimum contacts. Specific jurisdiction requires purposeful availment, relatedness, and reasonableness. Harbor purposefully availed itself of Guam by using a commissioned sales agent who visits quarterly, operating an interactive website that accepts Guam orders, and shipping $400,000 of goods into Guam over three years. The contract dispute arises directly from those Guam deliveries. Reasonableness factors-Harbor's burden, Guam's interest, plaintiff's interest in convenient relief, and the interstate judicial system's interest-do not make jurisdiction unreasonable; Harbor reached into Guam, and the money and goods are there. A one-off shipment might not suffice, but the quarterly agent visits and sustained revenue make this a strong specific-jurisdiction case. General jurisdiction is not needed.