All-Comers Policy and Selective Exemptions
Ridgeline State University recognizes roughly 120 student organizations, each of which receives $2,000, access to meeting rooms, and a listing in the student handbook. To be recognized, a group must sign the university's All-Comers Policy, which requires that any student be permitted to join and to seek leadership positions and forbids discrimination in membership or leadership on the basis of race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. Cornerstone Fellowship, a religious student group, requires its officers to affirm a statement of faith and to attend weekly worship. The student affairs office denies recognition, citing the policy. Cornerstone sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In discovery it emerges that the university granted written exemptions to two groups: a women's leadership club limited to women, and a political advocacy group whose officers must support its platform. The university calls the exemptions 'administrative errors' now under review. Cornerstone moves for a preliminary injunction.
1. Is the All-Comers Policy facially neutral, and does the university's treatment of Cornerstone amount to viewpoint discrimination?
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On its face, the policy is neutral. It applies to every student organization without regard to the group's message and prohibits several forms of discrimination. A court would begin with Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), which upheld a public law school's all-comers policy as a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to a limited public forum. Martinez emphasized that the policy was applied evenly to all comers and that the school had exempted no one. That is the weak point here.
The exemptions change the analysis. A limited public forum must be administered in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Once a university grants discretionary exemptions, a women's leadership club limited to women and a political group that screens officers by ideology, it has created a mechanism for favoring some viewpoints over others. Cornerstone can argue that its exclusion reflects not a neutral rule but disagreement with its religious views. That is the core of Rosenberger v. Rector and Widmar v. Vincent. If the court finds viewpoint discrimination, strict scrutiny applies and the policy is unlikely to survive.
The 'administrative error' explanation is not dispositive at the preliminary-injunction stage, but it matters. A court may credit it if the university promptly withdraws the exemptions and applies the policy uniformly going forward.
Level of scrutiny. In a limited public forum, restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Cornerstone's expressive-association argument (Boy Scouts v. Dale; Hurley) is secondary, because the university is not compelling membership; it is conditioning a subsidy.
2. Does Cornerstone have standing, and must it first seek an exemption before suing?
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Standing exists. Cornerstone suffered a concrete and particularized injury, denial of recognition, that is traceable to the university's policy and redressable by an injunction. It need not accept an invitation to seek a discretionary exemption: a plaintiff need not apply for an exception to challenge the rule that allegedly harms it. The ripeness doctrine is satisfied because the issue is purely legal, the policy is final, and further administrative process would not develop the record. The claim is not moot, since the denial continues to bar funding, meeting space, and listing.
One limit. Cornerstone must show the denial was because of its religious character. Its complaint and the written exemption evidence supply that link. If the record showed Cornerstone was denied for a neutral reason, such as a failure to submit required paperwork, standing would still exist but the merits would shift sharply.
Organizational standing is also clean: Cornerstone's members would have standing in their own right, the interests are germane to the group's purpose, and neither the claim nor the relief requires individual members' participation.
3. What standard governs the preliminary injunction, and how should the court weigh the equities?
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Standard. Winter v. NRDC requires the movant to show (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood of irreparable harm absent relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips its way, and (4) that an injunction serves the public interest. Some circuits also apply a sliding-scale variant for 'serious questions,' but that is circuit-specific and should be flagged as such.
Irreparable harm. Loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods, is presumed to constitute irreparable injury (Elrod v. Burns). The denial of a meeting room, funding, and a handbook listing is ongoing.
Merits. Cornerstone's strongest argument is the exemptions. If the university cannot explain why two groups received written exemptions while Cornerstone did not, the court may find viewpoint discrimination, which weighs heavily.
Equities and public interest. The university has an interest in enforcing its nondiscrimination policy and in avoiding a fractured student-organization system. Cornerstone has an interest in exercising its religion and expressive association. A narrow injunction is the better course: recognize Cornerstone during the litigation while directing the university to enforce the all-comers policy uniformly against every group.