Felony Murder, Withdrawal, and a Warrantless Phone Search
Owen and Priya agree to rob a check-cashing store. Priya drives and waits in the car; Owen enters with a gun. Inside, a customer, Lee, who lawfully carries a handgun, fires at Owen, misses, and kills the store clerk. Owen fires back and kills Lee. Priya hears the shots and drives away. Owen is arrested at the scene. After booking, detectives take Owen's phone from the property room and, without a warrant, scroll through his text messages, finding an exchange with Priya planning the robbery. Priya is charged with two counts of felony murder, robbery, and conspiracy. She argues she withdrew from the conspiracy two days earlier by texting Owen 'I'm out' and staying home that night, although she showed up on the day of the robbery and drove the car. The jurisdiction applies the common law and has not adopted the Model Penal Code.
1. Is Priya liable for felony murder for the clerk's death and for Lee's death? Discuss the agency and proximate-cause theories.
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Framework. Common-law felony murder imposes liability for a death caused during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. Armed robbery qualifies. The hard question is whose act counts.
Lee's death. Owen fired the shot that killed Lee during the robbery. Under either theory Priya is liable: Owen is a co-felon, the killing occurred during the felony, and malice is imputed. Priya's accomplice liability follows from her participation in the robbery.
The clerk's death. Lee fired the fatal shot. Under the agency theory, felony murder reaches only killings committed by a felon or an accomplice in furtherance of the felony. Lee was a victim, not an agent, so the clerk's death is not felony murder. Under the proximate-cause (Redline) theory, the felony is the but-for and proximate cause of foreseeable deaths, including those caused by resisting victims or police, so the clerk's death is felony murder. Jurisdictions split, and the opinion must say which rule it applies.
Limits under both theories. The death must be a foreseeable consequence and not so remote as to break the chain of causation. A shootout is the paradigm foreseeable risk of an armed robbery, so neither limit helps Priya.
Result. Priya is liable for Lee's death under both theories, and for the clerk's death only under the proximate-cause theory.
2. Did Priya effectively withdraw from the conspiracy and from the robbery? What must she show?
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Withdrawal from the conspiracy. A conspirator withdraws by communicating the withdrawal to co-conspirators and, where possible, taking affirmative steps to neutralize assistance already given, such as notifying police. Merely staying home is not enough. The text 'I'm out' communicates intent, but Priya then appeared on the day of the robbery and drove the car, which is continued participation. Even a valid withdrawal does not erase liability for crimes committed before withdrawal; it limits liability for subsequent substantive crimes under the Pinkerton doctrine.
Withdrawal from accomplice liability. Withdrawal requires repudiation or neutralizing the assistance, and it must occur before the crime. Driving the car to the scene is affirmative assistance after the purported withdrawal.
Practical consequence. Priya cannot claim the benefit of the withdrawal defense. She remains liable for the robbery, for the conspiracy, and for the foreseeable killings as analyzed above. Her best remaining arguments are factual: that she did not know Owen was armed, or that the shootings were outside the scope of the agreement. Those arguments go to the scope of the conspiracy, not to withdrawal.
3. Should the text messages be suppressed? Analyze the search of Owen's phone and Priya's standing to object.
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Riley controls. Riley v. California (2014) holds that police generally may not search the digital contents of a cell phone seized incident to arrest without a warrant. The phone was in the property room, so the search-incident-to-arrest rationales, officer safety and evidence preservation, are at their weakest. The search is presumptively unreasonable.
Exceptions are unavailable. Exigency (remote wiping, a fleeing confederate) could justify a warrantless search, but nothing in the record suggests either. The third-party doctrine does not reach the contents of a phone. Consent is absent. The good-faith exception is unlikely to apply, because Riley was decided in 2014 and the rule is clearly established.
Standing. Priya is a party to the exchange and has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own messages and in the conversation. Owen also has standing as the owner and user. Either may move to suppress.
Effect. If the messages are suppressed, the prosecution may still use independent evidence from the robbery, but the planning exchange cannot come in. Note that the co-conspirator statement exception governs admissibility of statements, not the validity of a warrantless search.