Coalition Arithmetic in a Hung Assembly

The Governor should not mechanically invite the largest party. The constitutional convention is to invite the person who is most likely to command a majority in the House. B, C and D have submitted a joint claim of 70 seats in a 126-member House, which is above the majority mark of 64. That is a stronger prima facie claim than A's 57. The Governor should therefore invite B's leader, ask for a list of supporting MLAs, and set a reasonable deadline, usually about ten days, for a floor test. The Governor should not adjudicate the disqualification petitions against the two C MLAs; that is for the Speaker. But the Governor may note that the claim is clouded and should seek the Assembly Secretary's advice on valid membership.

The Governor must also refuse to make C's policy demands a condition of government formation. The Deputy Chief Minister post, a ₹500 crore package, and a judicial inquiry are political matters for the coalition, not constitutional preconditions. C's threat to block a floor test is not acceptable; a floor test is how majority is proved. If B fails the floor test, the Governor may then invite A. The Governor's role is to ensure a government that can survive, not to award power to the largest party or to the loudest coalition.

A B–C–D government would have 66 seats without independents, just above the majority mark of 64. With four of the six independents, it would have 70. That is workable but fragile. C has 18 seats and is the pivotal partner; if C withdraws, the government falls unless independents and D stay. C's three demands show that it wants visible power and regional benefits. The Deputy Chief Minister post is manageable, but a ₹500 crore package and a judicial inquiry could conflict with B's own constituency and with the independence of the judiciary. The two C MLAs photographed with A are a warning: C's own flock may split.

Stability would depend on a written common minimum programme, a power-sharing formula, and regular coordination. The coalition should avoid making the inquiry a condition of confidence; that would politicise the judiciary. Instead, B could agree to a time-bound administrative review or a legislative committee, not a pre-announced judicial verdict. C's leader should control her MLAs and issue a whip only on confidence motions and budget votes, not on every issue. The independents should be handled transparently, not with secret deals. Even then, the government may last only if A's disqualification petitions fail and C stays united. A minority or fragile coalition is not unconstitutional, but it requires restraint.

The Tenth Schedule disqualifies a legislator who voluntarily gives up membership of his or her party or votes against a party whip in the House. Merely meeting A's leaders is not automatically defection. It becomes defection if the MLAs formally join A, publicly renounce C, or act against C's whip in a way that shows voluntary giving up of membership. The Speaker decides disqualification, and courts have limited power to review the Speaker's decision, though they can intervene if the decision is procedurally flawed or mala fide.

A split of the party is no longer a general exemption after the 91st Amendment; only a merger in which at least two-thirds of a party's legislators agree to merge is protected. C has 18 MLAs, so two MLAs are far below two-thirds. If they simply negotiate with A, C's leader can issue a whip and seek disqualification if they disobey. The Governor should not disqualify them or treat them as A's supporters until the Speaker decides. A's claim of 57 seats cannot include the two disputed MLAs unless they are validly accepted. The episode shows why coalition partners need clear whips and why the Governor should rely on verified numbers, not photographs and press reports.