Street Vendors and the Clean City Order

The ban interferes with the vendors' negative freedom: the freedom from arbitrary interference in their chosen trade. Street vending is work, and the vendors have not been accused of a crime; they are being removed to improve traffic and the city's image. But negative freedom is not absolute. The corporation has a legitimate interest in clear pavements, pedestrian safety, and ambulance access. The question is whether a blanket ban on 14 roads is necessary and proportionate, or whether less restrictive regulation, such as designated vending zones and peak-hour restrictions, would work.

Positive freedom matters too: real freedom requires the capability to earn a living, not just the absence of legal restraint. Removing 4,200 vendors without adequate nearby space reduces their positive freedom. The alternative site has only 600 stalls and is 11 km away, which is inaccessible for women who also manage households. Equality is central because 60% of the affected vendors are women and average earnings are low. A policy that imposes the heaviest burden on the poorest is not equal treatment; it may be indirect discrimination. The planner's evidence that 12,000 private cars cause congestion also weakens the claim that vendors are the main problem. A just policy would regulate both, but protect the vulnerable group first.

Rawls's difference principle says inequalities are justified only if they benefit the least advantaged. A permanent ban that removes 4,200 livelihoods and offers 600 distant stalls fails that test. The least advantaged are the women vendors with low earnings and limited mobility. A policy should be judged by whether it improves their position, not by the city's award or the convenience of car owners. Sen's capability approach shifts attention from income to what people can actually do: vend, move safely, access credit, and care for families. The alternative site 11 km away does not expand capability; it may shrink it.

A recommended policy would start with a survey and consultation, as the Street Vendors Act envisages. The city should create nearby vending zones on side streets, provide interim licences, toilets, storage, and credit, and enforce no-vending only where pedestrians and ambulances genuinely need clear passage. It should phase restrictions and monitor displacement. At the same time, it should regulate illegal parking and improve public transport, since cars are a major cause of congestion. Compensation is not enough; the goal is to preserve the vendors' capability to earn while reclaiming safe pavements. If the city can show that a specific road must be cleared, it must first provide a viable nearby alternative. That would satisfy the difference principle and make the policy proportionate.

A court should test the ban against Article 19(1)(g), which protects the freedom to carry on trade or business, and Article 19(6), which allows reasonable restrictions in the public interest. The restriction must be backed by a legitimate purpose, such as road safety, and must be proportionate: the state must show that a blanket ban is necessary and that less restrictive alternatives were considered. A permanent ban on 14 roads, with only 600 alternative stalls, is likely to fail proportionality because it destroys the trade rather than regulates it. Article 21's right to livelihood is also relevant, as are Article 14's protection against arbitrariness and the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, which requires surveys, vending committees, and relocation safeguards.

The court should also examine procedure: was there consultation, notice, and a hearing? Was the impact on women considered? Did the corporation rely on evidence, or on the 'clean city' image? The fact that illegal parking by 12,000 cars contributes to congestion undermines the claim that vendors are the main cause. The court should not itself design a vending policy, but it can quash the permanent ban and direct the corporation to prepare a time-bound plan with nearby sites, interim licences, and periodic review. A temporary stay is appropriate to prevent irreversible harm while the plan is made.