Five Sectors through the Window of Circadian Low: Roster, Rest and Commander's Discretion

Work through the elements rather than the total only.

• FDP against the table. The maximum FDP for a two-pilot crew is set by report time and sector count. A 13 h 35 min FDP with five sectors is beyond the table value for a two-pilot crew in any report-time band - sector count above two progressively reduces the limit, and a night report reduces it further.
• Window of circadian low. 3 h 40 min of the duty sits in the 02:00-06:00 window, which is exactly what the WOCL restrictions exist for. Encroachment of that size attracts a further reduction and, in most versions of the table, a lower ceiling on sectors.
• Rest before the duty. Previous duty ended 10:30, report 21:30, so 11 hours gate to gate, less two hours of transport, leaving roughly nine hours at home. That is below the minimum rest required before an FDP (12 hours at base under the CAR; even the Annex 6 floor of 10 hours is barely met before transport is deducted).
• Cumulatives. 96 hours in 28 days against a 100-hour limit leaves almost no headroom for a 9-hour day; the 7-day and 24-hour figures also need checking, and yesterday's 9 h 20 min already makes this a heavy sequence.

Every one of these tests fails or is marginal. This is not a roster that needs a small adjustment.

No. Commander's discretion is a narrow safety valve for unforeseeable circumstances that arise after the duty has begun - a destination diversion, an unforecast hold, a medical emergency. It is not a planning tool and it is not available to cover a delay that is already known before report.

Three specific problems with the chief pilot's advice:

• The extension sought is two and a half hours. The discretion available under the CAR is capped, currently at two hours, and that cap cannot be exceeded by agreement.
• The circumstance is not unforeseen: the delayed inbound aircraft is known before the crew reports, so the discretion is not engaged at all.
• Even where validly used, it must be recorded with the reason and reported to the operator and the DGCA; it is auditable, not a verbal permission from a chief pilot.

The 'augmented crew' claim fails as well. A pilot positioning in the jump seat is a passenger for FDTL purposes. Augmentation requires an additional qualified operating crew member and an approved rest facility, with the limits and rest allocation defined in the CAR. A jump-seat body does not convert a two-pilot crew into an augmented one.

Commander. He must not accept the roster as published. Options, in order of preference:

• ask for the rotation to be re-planned (split the sectors between two crews, drop the last rotation, or move the duty to a compliant report time);
• ask for a different crew, or a delay that restores the full rest period;
• if the flight is already in progress and an unforeseen delay occurs, use only the discretion actually available, record it and report it;
• refuse, record the refusal and the reason in writing, and file a fatigue report.

He cannot negotiate the numbers by phone, and a verbal assurance is not an authorisation.

Operator. The AOC holder is responsible for producing rosters that comply, for tracking cumulative limits automatically, for ensuring rest is real rest (transport time counts against it), and for operating a fatigue reporting system that does not punish reporters. The chief pilot's call is itself a reportable failing of supervision: pressure to use a discretion that does not exist is a safety issue, not a scheduling preference.

If flown as rostered: the crew and the operator both face enforcement action, the flight is outside the approved scheme and the insurance position is exposed, and the fatigue exposure on a five-sector night with an encroaching WOCL is exactly the profile that produces approach-and-landing errors.