Philosophy of Mind, Self and Consciousness
Philosophy of Mind, Self and Consciousness
This domain examines the relation between mind and body, the nature of consciousness, and what makes a person the same self over time. Exam questions often require you to compare dualism with physicalist theories.
Core rules
- Substance dualism holds that mind and body are distinct substances; property dualism holds that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties.
- Physicalist theories include behaviourism (mental terms describe behaviour), identity theory (mental states are brain states), and functionalism (mental states are defined by causal roles).
- The hard problem of consciousness asks why physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience (qualia).
- Personal identity can be analysed through bodily continuity, psychological continuity, memory, or narrative selfhood.
- The self may be treated as a substance, a bundle of experiences (Hume), or a social construction.
Worked example
If pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then any creature without C-fibres cannot feel pain. Functionalists reject this: pain is whatever state is caused by tissue damage and causes avoidance and distress. A silicon system with the same functional role could, in principle, feel pain. The example shows how identity theory and functionalism differ over multiple realizability.
Traps
Do not equate consciousness with self-awareness; do not assume functionalism explains qualia; and do not confuse personal identity with bodily identity. Define ‘mental state’ clearly.