The sale-deed deadline, the 2022 refusal, and Order VII Rule 11
On 15 January 2019, Meena, the owner of a residential plot in Jaipur, signed an agreement to sell it to Rakesh for ₹60,00,000. Rakesh paid ₹6,00,000 as earnest money. The agreement stated that the sale deed would be executed on or before 15 January 2020, when the balance would be paid at registration. Rakesh says he repeatedly asked Meena to fix a date, but she postponed. On 1 February 2022, Meena's advocate sent a notice saying the agreement stood cancelled because Rakesh had never tendered the balance. Rakesh replied on 10 February 2022 asserting that he had always been ready and willing. On 10 January 2024, he filed a suit for specific performance. The plaint pleads that in 2019 he held ₹54,00,000 in a fixed deposit, but encashed it in December 2020 for his daughter's wedding; that he was nevertheless able to arrange funds; and that Meena's refusal in 2022 furnished the cause of action. Meena applies under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, arguing that the suit is barred by limitation. She also contends that the plaint itself admits a lack of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.
1. Should the civil judge allow Meena's application under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the ground of limitation? Decide, giving reasons.
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Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 fixes three years from the date fixed for performance; only where no date is fixed does the date of refusal govern. The agreement fixed 15 January 2020. The plaint discloses that date, and the suit was filed on 10 January 2024 - beyond three years. The refusal of 1 February 2022 cannot restart limitation under the first limb. For Order VII Rule 11(d), the court looks at the plaint and the documents annexed; it does not try disputed facts. Here the bar appears on the plaint itself. The plaintiff's plea that he was ready and willing is not an answer to limitation. The application should therefore be allowed and the plaint rejected. If the plaint had pleaded a subsequent agreement extending time, or an acknowledgment under Section 18, the result could differ; those facts are absent. The court should record that the rejection is without prejudice to a fresh suit if any fresh cause of action exists.
2. If the plaint survives, how should the court assess readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?
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Section 16(c) requires the plaintiff both to aver and to prove readiness and willingness from the date of the agreement until the decree. The averment is not enough. The plaint says Rakesh had ₹54,00,000 in 2019 but used it for his daughter's wedding in December 2020, and made no tender until after the 2022 refusal. That does not automatically prove want of readiness; he may show he could have raised funds. But the burden is on him. The explanation to Section 16(c) excuses actual tender where the seller has refused performance, not the need to be ready before the refusal. His delay and conduct are relevant. Since these are triable issues, they cannot be decided on an Order VII Rule 11 application; if the plaint were not rejected, the court would frame an issue and decide after evidence. If he fails to prove continuous readiness, the suit must be dismissed even if the agreement is genuine.
3. May Rakesh amend the plaint to add a claim for damages? What difference does the limitation position make?
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Order VI Rule 17 CPC permits amendment at any stage, but after trial has commenced the court must be satisfied that the amendment was not delayed by lack of due diligence. More importantly, an amendment cannot be used to introduce a claim that is already time-barred. A claim for damages for breach arises when the seller refused performance or when the date fixed expired. If the specific performance suit is itself beyond limitation, the damages claim is also likely to be barred. The court may allow an alternative relief of damages only if it arises from the same cause of action, is within time, and does not prejudice the defendant. On these facts, the amendment should not be allowed to defeat the limitation bar or to convert a time-barred specific performance suit into a damages suit.