Interpretation of Statutes and Legal Drafting Principles
What this domain tests
This domain tests statutory interpretation and drafting principles used in judicial legislation. Expect questions on the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, the purposive approach, and the meaning of drafting conventions.
Core rules and concepts
- The primary rule is to give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words in context and in light of the statute's purpose.
- Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires interpretation to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.
- The Interpretation Act supplies default rules, for example on the meaning of "may" and "shall" and on commencement.
- Drafting principles include plain language, consistent definitions, logical structure, and clear commencement provisions.
- "May" is generally permissive; "must" is mandatory. The context can still alter the meaning.
Worked example
A statute says the JSC "may" hold a hearing. A candidate argues a hearing is mandatory. Reasoning: "may" is permissive unless the context indicates otherwise. If the statute's purpose requires a hearing before a adverse finding, the court may read it as mandatory to achieve procedural fairness. The correct method is text in context, not a mechanical rule.
Traps that cost marks
- Applying a literal reading without considering purpose and context.
- Treating "may" as always mandatory.
- Ignoring section 39(2) constitutional interpretation.
- Confusing interpretation with amendment; courts interpret, they do not rewrite statutes.