Char Siu Cooling Log Gap Before an Inspection
Sunday dim sum service for 320 covers. On Saturday at 22:30, 28 kg of char siu pork is removed from the combi oven and divided into six 15 cm deep stainless pans, covered and left on the pass because the walk-in is full. At 00:15 the night porter probes one pan at 38°C and moves all pans into the walk-in at 4°C. The cooling log has entries only at 22:30 (74°C) and 00:15 (38°C); no 21°C checkpoint. At 09:00 the sous-chef plans to slice the pork for char siu bao and rice rolls, reheating portions in the steamer. The walk-in thermometer reads 3°C, but a probe calibration check at 08:50 reads 2°C in ice water and 100°C in boiling water. The environmental health officer is due at 11:00. The restaurant has a vacuum packer and a blast chiller that was not used.
1. Evaluate the cooling record against two-stage cooling. What should happen to the 28 kg char siu?
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The record is not adequate. The pork was left in 15 cm deep, covered pans on the pass from 22:30 to 00:15. At 00:15 one pan was 38°C, so the batch had not reached the first critical limit of 21°C; the other pans were not probed. There is no 21°C checkpoint and no evidence of when the batch passed through the danger zone. Moving the pans to a 4°C walk-in at 00:15 may have cooled them eventually, but a single end-point probe at 09:00 cannot prove that the 2-hour/4-hour two-stage cooling was met. Because the food is a cooked, ready-to-eat pork product and the process is unverified, the safe disposition is to discard all 28 kg. Reheating does not reliably destroy heat-stable staphylococcal toxins that may have formed. Do not slice it for bao or rice rolls. Record the discard, notify the chef, and treat this as a corrective action, not a paperwork issue.
2. Identify the root causes and set corrective actions for the next dim sum production.
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Root causes: the walk-in was full, so the pass became an unplanned cooling area; pans were too deep and covered, trapping heat; no blast chiller was used; nobody owned the 21°C checkpoint; and the night porter probed only one pan. Corrective actions: schedule char siu production earlier or use the blast chiller; divide 28 kg into shallow 5 cm pans, uncovered until surface is set, and space them for airflow; probe at least two pans, including the centre of the thickest piece, at start, 2-hour and end points; record time, temperature, pan number and corrective action. Put a laminated cooling log at the pass and assign a named person for each batch. Verify probe calibration monthly and after drops. Review the walk-in loading plan before weekend production. The probe check at 08:50 was acceptable, so calibration is not the root cause; the process design is.
3. The EHO arrives at 11:00. How should the restaurant present the incident and what evidence should it have ready?
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Be transparent and factual. Present the cooling log, the probe calibration record, the discard record for the 28 kg, the corrective-action note, and the revised cooling procedure. Explain that the batch was discarded because the 21°C checkpoint was missing, not because the EHO caught it; that is a stronger position than defending an unverified product. Show the blast-chiller use plan, shallow-pan setup, named monitoring assignee and training records. If the EHO asks for the char siu on the line, do not offer any batch from the affected production. Do not backfill the log or create a 21°C entry that was not measured. After the visit, add a weekly verification check and a second-person review of weekend cooling records. The goal is to demonstrate that the hazard was identified, controlled by discard, and prevented from recurring.