Seven Minutes Without a RIT

The safety officer should structure the AAR around facts and system barriers, not personalities. He should reconstruct a timeline from dispatch records, radio logs, PASS activations, company assignments, and interviews. He should separate unintentional human error from reckless conduct and explain that distinction to both the union and the deputy chief. The union's request for a non-punitive review is compatible with accountability if the review identifies individual violations as well as system failures. The deputy chief's demand for immediate discipline should be routed to a separate process after the facts are established; discipline before the AAR would discourage candid reporting. The AAR should include a confidential interview process, a written findings section, and a corrective-action plan with owners and dates. The reasoning is that the department needs both learning and accountability. A review that blames only the freelancing company will miss the tag, radio, and RIT deployment failures that delayed rescue.

Likely root causes include unreliable tag collection at the passport, unclear radio channel assignment for RIT, no timed RIT deployment benchmark, and a company operating outside its assigned division. The missing Mayday transmission suggests the IC was overloaded or the radio traffic was not managed. Corrective actions should be specific: designate an accountability officer at every working fire, require a tag audit before entry, assign a dedicated Mayday and RIT channel, and conduct timed RIT drills with a seven-minute benchmark. The department should also add a radio discipline refresher and a tactical worksheet that shows division boundaries. The three companies due for RIT drills should be scheduled within 30 days, and the accountability audit should be repeated at 90 days with a target above 95%. The reasoning is that each recommendation addresses a barrier identified in the timeline rather than a general call for better training.

The department should separate the two issues. The freelancing company should be addressed through a fair, documented process that determines whether the action was a violation, an error, or a system-induced failure. The deputy chief should not impose discipline before the AAR establishes the facts. Diaz should be recognized for calling the Mayday and should not be blamed for falling; the review should ask why the Mayday was not heard. The department should adopt a written just-culture policy that distinguishes human error, at-risk behavior, and reckless conduct, and it should explain that policy to the union and the crews. The reasoning is that future firefighters will hesitate to call a Mayday or report a near-miss if they see Diaz punished or the freelancing company scapegoated. At the same time, accountability requires a clear consequence framework. The AAR should recommend the policy, and the discipline decision should follow it.