Revocation for a Highway and the Compensation Bundle
In 2019 the Governor of a state granted Musa a statutory right of occupancy over Plot 14, GRA. Musa built a two-storey commercial building, planted 40 mature oil palm trees, and in 2023 granted a five-year lease of the ground floor to Tanimu. In 2025 the Governor published a notice revoking the right to enable a dual-carriageway. The notice named Musa only, stated “overriding public interest”, and offered compensation for the building at N18 million, with nothing for the trees or Tanimu’s lease. Musa’s survey plan shows the road will take 60 per cent of the plot; the building sits outside the carriageway but access will be lost. Tanimu has paid rent to 2026 and claims relocation costs. The state valuer says trees are not “improvements” and Tanimu is not a “holder” under the Land Use Act. Musa and Tanimu consult you.
1. Was the revocation valid, and does service of the notice on Musa alone suffice for Tanimu?
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Issue. The validity of a revocation under the Land Use Act depends on the statutory ground and the process, not on the adequacy of compensation.
Analysis. A statutory right of occupancy may be revoked for overriding public interest under section 28. A highway is a classic public purpose, so the stated ground is lawful on its face. The notice must identify the holder and the ground; naming Musa, the holder, is the normal statutory requirement. Tanimu is a lessee, not the holder of the right of occupancy. His interest is derivative and is extinguished by a valid revocation of the superior right. Failure to serve Tanimu personally does not therefore invalidate the revocation as against Musa. It does, however, affect Tanimu’s entitlement to be heard on compensation: as an occupier with unexhausted improvements and disturbance, he has a practical claim, and the state should not simply ignore him. The stronger challenge would be colourable purpose: if the evidence showed the road was a pretext for a private estate, the revocation could be attacked as ultra vires.
Conclusion. The revocation is likely valid if the highway purpose is genuine and the notice complies with the Act. Service on Musa is sufficient to revoke the right, but Tanimu retains a compensation claim for disturbance and any tenant’s improvements.
2. Which heads of compensation are payable, and how should the valuer treat the oil palms, the lease and the loss of access?
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Issue. Compensation must be assessed under the statutory heads, not by the state’s labels.
Analysis. The Land Use Act’s compensation scheme distinguishes between the land and unexhausted improvements. Buildings are the obvious improvement. Mature oil palm trees planted by Musa are also economic improvements: they have a capital value and an income-producing function, and the valuer should value them as such rather than dismiss them as “not improvements”. The lease to Tanimu is a compensable interest in the sense that revocation destroys it; Tanimu may claim disturbance, relocation costs and any unexhausted improvements he made, while Musa may claim the value of his reversionary interest subject to the lease. Double recovery must be avoided. Loss of access is more difficult: if no land is taken from the building but access is substantially impaired, the valuer should consider severance or injurious affection in the overall assessment, although the Act’s express heads are narrower than a general damages claim. The state cannot simply offer a building figure and ignore trees, leasehold disturbance and access.
Conclusion. Compensation should cover the building, the oil palms as economic improvements, Tanimu’s disturbance and unexhausted improvements, and any proven severance/injurious affection. The valuer must give reasons for each head and avoid double counting.
3. What remedies are available if the compensation is inadequate or the notice is defective?
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Issue. The claimant needs a remedy that matches the defect: inadequate compensation is different from an invalid revocation.
Analysis. If the revocation is within power but the compensation is inadequate, the proper course is to challenge the assessment. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of compensation under the Land Use Act, and the claimant can lead valuation evidence on the building, trees, leasehold disturbance and access. If the notice is defective in a jurisdictional sense - for example, it discloses no public purpose, names the wrong land, or is a pretext - the claimant may seek judicial review or a declaration that the revocation is invalid. A court will not readily substitute its view for the Governor’s on the merits of a public purpose, but it can intervene where the power is exercised for an improper purpose or outside the Act. Tanimu should also consider a direct claim against the state and, depending on the lease, against Musa for the unexpired term.
Conclusion. Musa should challenge the compensation quantum with valuation evidence; if the purpose is colourable, he should attack the revocation itself. Tanimu should pursue disturbance and relocation costs, and the state should be pressed to treat the lease as a compensable interest rather than a nullity.