Quasi-Easement, a Locked Gate, and a Garden That Vest Title
In 2003 Owen owned a 40-acre tract in New Mexico with a gravel driveway connecting a farmhouse to the county road. Owen split the tract, conveying the landlocked northern 15 acres (Parcel A) to Alice by a deed that said nothing about access, and Alice recorded. Alice used the driveway daily. In 2005 Owen conveyed the southern 25 acres (Parcel B, containing the driveway and all road frontage) to Bob, who recorded and knew Alice used the driveway. In 2008 Bob installed a locked gate across the driveway and told Alice to find another route; Alice removed the lock and continued to use the driveway. In 2010 Alice fenced a 20-by-30-foot vegetable garden that encroached 12 feet onto Parcel B and farmed it openly every season through 2024. In 2020 Bob conveyed Parcel B to Carol by warranty deed; Carol paid fair value, recorded, and had the property surveyed in 2024, discovering the garden. Carol sues to eject Alice. Alice counterclaims for an easement over the driveway and for title to the fenced strip. The jurisdiction has a 10-year adverse-possession statute and a notice recording statute.
1. Does Alice have an enforceable easement over the driveway that binds Carol, and how does Bob's 2008 locked gate affect it?
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Alice has an easement that binds Carol, and the gate is an unreasonable interference rather than an extinguishment.
Two independent theories support the easement, and both trace to the 2003 severance.
First, an implied easement from prior use (a quasi-easement). The requirements are common ownership, a use that existed at the time of severance, and a use that was apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary to enjoyment of the dominant parcel. Owen owned both parcels and used the driveway for the benefit of what became Parcel A; the gravel driveway is plainly visible and was in constant use. Reasonable necessity, not strict necessity, is the standard here, and Alice meets it.
Second, an easement by necessity. Parcel A is landlocked with no road frontage. A grantor who conveys a landlocked parcel impliedly reserves a right of way over the retained land, and this theory needs no prior use - only strict necessity at the time of severance.
Carol's recording statute does not defeat these interests. Under a notice statute, Carol is protected only if she took without notice, and inquiry notice defeats her: a visible driveway in daily use by the owner of the adjacent parcel would prompt a reasonable purchaser to inquire. Carol is charged with what that inquiry would have revealed.
Bob's 2008 gate is a different matter. The servient owner may maintain gates and fences so long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the easement's purpose; a locked gate with no key to Alice plainly does. Alice's removal of the lock is self-help that a court may criticize, but it does not abandon or extinguish the easement. Nonuse alone never extinguishes an easement; abandonment requires intent plus conduct, and Alice's conduct shows the opposite.
2. Who owns the 12-foot strip of the garden, and does Carol's 2020 purchase for value and recording change the result?
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Alice owns the strip; Carol's deed conveyed nothing as to it.
The elements of adverse possession are actual, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile possession for the statutory period, here 10 years. Alice's fenced, cultivated garden satisfies each: it was physical use of the sort a true owner makes; a 20-by-30-foot fenced vegetable garden is unmistakably visible; her use excluded Bob and Carol; she farmed it every season from 2010 through 2024, which is continuous for the nature of the land; and her possession was hostile, because the objective standard treats possession without the owner's permission as hostile regardless of the possessor's state of mind. Alice's belief that the garden was hers - or, alternatively, her indifference - does not matter.
The statutory period ran in 2020. At that moment, title to the strip vested in Alice by operation of law, without any deed or recording.
Carol's 2020 deed from Bob is therefore ineffective as to the strip. A grantor cannot convey what he no longer owns. Carol's warranty deed covers only what Bob held, and the notice recording statute cannot help her: recording acts protect a purchaser for value against prior unrecorded conveyances from the same grantor, not against a title that vested by operation of law and was never Bob's to convey.
Nor can Carol invoke her status as a purchaser without notice. First, the fence and cultivation gave her inquiry notice. Second, and independently, notice is irrelevant once the adverse possessor's title has already vested. Carol loses the ejectment claim as to the strip and effectively takes Parcel B subject to the fenced parcel.
Practical caveat: some jurisdictions require payment of property taxes or color of title for adverse possession. If this jurisdiction has such a requirement, Alice must prove compliance, and the outcome could change.