IP network security
IP network security
This domain tests hardening and policy on Nokia SR OS: control-plane protection, filters and ACLs, routing authentication, Layer 2 security, and management access.
Core rules
- CPM filters protect the control plane. They are ingress filters applied to CPM traffic and should default to drop with explicit permits for BGP, IGP, SSH, NTP, and TACACS+/RADIUS.
- Route authentication: BGP supports TCP MD5 and keychains using SHA-1/SHA-256; IS-IS and OSPF support authentication. Keychains allow rotation.
- uRPF drops packets with spoofed source addresses; loose mode is used on multihomed links.
- Management: TACACS+/RADIUS for AAA, SSHv2, SNMPv3, and local fallback; disable Telnet.
- Layer 2 hardening includes MACsec, DHCP snooping, and port security where supported.
Worked example
A PE peers eBGP with a customer on 192.0.2.1/30. Create a CPM IPv4 filter with default action drop; permit TCP 179 from 192.0.2.1 to local 192.0.2.2; then apply the filter to CPM. Verify that SSH from an unauthorised subnet is dropped and that the BGP session stays up.
Traps
- A default-drop CPM filter without NTP or TACACS+ permits locks out management.
- Applying an ACL to a SAP instead of CPM leaves the control plane exposed.
- MD5 authenticates BGP but does not encrypt it.
- Forgetting that CPM filters affect all CPM traffic, including management and routing.