NRB Assistant Director study materials
NRB Assistant Director study resources

A Development Bank Facing a Deposit Run

NRB Assistant Director · Put your knowledge to work in context.

All case studies

A Development Bank Facing a Deposit Run

Janakpur National Development Bank has NPR 45 billion in deposits, NPR 38 billion in loans, and NPR 4.5 billion in liquid assets: NPR 3.0 billion in Treasury bills and NPR 1.5 billion in cash and balances with the central bank. A viral social media video falsely claims the bank has lent NPR 6 billion to a failing cooperative. In five days, depositors withdraw NPR 6.0 billion. Over the next 30 days, projected deposit outflow is NPR 9.0 billion and contracted inflows are NPR 2.0 billion; the bank also has NPR 1.0 billion of committed interbank lines. Its capital is NPR 4.0 billion against risk-weighted assets of NPR 39 billion, and its NPL ratio is 2.8%. The central bank's liquidity facility is priced at the bank rate plus 200 basis points and requires government securities as collateral. The bank's chairman is a former minister and asks for an emergency guarantee without collateral.

1. Compute a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio using the data given, and a five-day cash coverage measure. Is this a liquidity problem, a solvency problem, or both?

Read the worked answer

Thirty-day net outflow = projected outflow 9.0 - contracted inflows 2.0 = NPR 7.0 billion. Liquid assets are NPR 4.5 billion, so the liquidity coverage ratio is 4.5/7.0 = 64.3%, below 100%; the shortfall is NPR 2.5 billion. For five days, liquid assets 4.5 plus the committed interbank line 1.0 = NPR 5.5 billion against NPR 6.0 billion of withdrawals, a NPR 0.5 billion shortfall. That is a genuine liquidity problem. But capital is NPR 4.0 billion against RWA of NPR 39 billion, a CAR of 10.26%, below the 11% minimum in this scenario. The bank is thinly capitalized, so a fire sale of loans to meet withdrawals could turn the liquidity problem into insolvency. The correct diagnosis is both: an acute liquidity run layered on a weak capital position. NPLs of 2.8% are not yet the main problem; confidence and funding structure are.

2. Advise the central bank on whether to provide liquidity support. Specify collateral, pricing, conditions and the reason an unsecured guarantee is inappropriate.

Read the worked answer

Liquidity support can be justified only if the bank is assessed as solvent but illiquid. The central bank should lend against the NPR 3.0 billion of Treasury bills, with a haircut, at the bank rate plus 200 basis points or higher, for a short tenor. It should require a liquidity plan, a capital restoration plan, a freeze on dividends and management bonuses, and daily reporting of deposit flows. The unsecured guarantee requested by the chairman should be refused: it transfers private risk to the central bank, weakens collateral discipline and creates moral hazard for other banks. If the bank cannot post sufficient collateral, the central bank should consider a resolution route, not a blanket guarantee. Any support should be disclosed in aggregate and accompanied by a communication strategy to counter the false rumor.

3. Assume the bank is ultimately placed in liquidation. Deposit insurance covers up to NPR 500,000 per depositor. About 80% of depositors by number are fully covered, but large depositors hold 45% of deposit value. Explain the payout and stability implications.

Read the worked answer

The insurance scheme protects small depositors, which limits social distress, but the 45% of deposit value held by large depositors is largely uninsured. A liquidation would therefore impose significant losses on businesses and local institutions, with contagion risk for other development banks. The payout cost should be estimated from covered deposits, not total deposits; the 80% by number figure is not a cost estimate because many covered accounts are small. The supervisor should coordinate with the insurer, publish a clear timeline, and ring-fence insured deposits. For the system, the case argues for stronger liquidity monitoring, limits on reliance on large uninsured deposits, and a resolution framework that can transfer insured deposits and good assets rather than simply liquidate. Moral hazard must be balanced against depositor confidence.