Reinterrogation After an Unambiguous Request for Counsel
At 9:05 p.m., a Tulsa detective advised Damon, arrested for armed robbery, of his Miranda rights. Damon said, 'I don't want to talk. I want a lawyer.' The detective stopped questioning and returned him to a holding cell. At 10:45 p.m., Damon asked a jailer, 'Can I talk to that detective? I want to explain something.' The jailer called the detective. At 11:00 p.m., the detective returned, re-advised Damon of his rights, and said, 'You asked to see me. Are you willing to talk now?' Damon signed a written waiver and confessed. The detective did not threaten or promise leniency, and Damon had no counsel present. Damon moves to suppress the confession, arguing that once he invoked counsel, all later interrogation was barred. The State argues Damon initiated the contact and validly waived. Damon is 34, has a GED, and has two prior felony convictions. The interview lasted 40 minutes.
1. Should the court suppress Damon's confession under Edwards v. Arizona? Explain.
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No, likely not. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), requires police to stop interrogation once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, and they may not resume unless counsel is present or the suspect initiates further communication. Damon plainly invoked counsel at 9:05. But at 10:45 he spontaneously asked the jailer to contact the detective because he wanted to 'explain something.' That is initiation under Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). The detective then re-advised him, confirmed his willingness to talk, and obtained a written waiver. Voluntariness is assessed from the totality: no threats or promises, a 40-minute interview, and a 34-year-old suspect with a GED and prior felony experience. On these facts the confession should be admitted.
2. Suppose the jailer had said, 'If you tell me what happened, I'll tell the prosecutor you cooperated,' and Damon confessed to the jailer. Would the result change?
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Yes. The jailer is a state agent, and the remark was designed to elicit an incriminating response. Because Damon had already invoked counsel, Edwards bars police-initiated interrogation unless counsel is present or Damon reinitiates. Here the jailer, not Damon, prompted the confession, so Damon did not initiate. The promise of leniency also undermines voluntariness under the totality test. The confession to the jailer should be suppressed, and any later confession tainted by that remark would require proof that the taint was dissipated.
3. If Damon had said only 'I don't want to talk' and not mentioned a lawyer, would the analysis differ?
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It would shift from Edwards to Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Invocation of the right to silence requires police to scrupulously honor the request, but it does not create the same permanent bar as an invocation of counsel. Police may reinterview after a significant interval, with fresh warnings, if the suspect's right to cut off questioning is respected. Because Damon himself initiated the 10:45 contact, a later waiver would still be admissible if voluntary. The key facts remain who initiated and whether the waiver was uncoerced.