The 1:10 A.M. Stop, the Refused Blood Draw, and the 400-Day Delay
At 1:10 a.m., a Pennsylvania state trooper sees Ruiz's sedan cross the fog line twice on Route 22. The trooper stops the car. Ruiz has bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and says he had 'two beers at a wedding.' Field sobriety tests show six clues; a portable breath test reads .091. Ruiz is arrested at 1:45 a.m. and taken to a hospital. The trooper reads the Pennsylvania implied-consent warning; Ruiz refuses the blood test. Without a warrant, the trooper tells a nurse to draw blood, which shows .14% BAC. At the station, before any Miranda warnings, Ruiz says, 'I only had two beers; I'm not drunk.' He is charged with DUI highest rate and a summary lane violation. Because of a bail-processing error, Ruiz stays in custody three days. The Commonwealth does not bring him to trial for 400 days. Ruiz moves to suppress the blood result and his statement and to dismiss under Rule 600.
1. Was the traffic stop lawful, and what role does the portable breath test play?
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Yes. A police officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or criminal activity. Crossing the fog line twice supports reasonable suspicion that Ruiz failed to drive within a single lane under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) and that he may be impaired. The subjective motive of the trooper is irrelevant; a valid traffic violation justifies the stop even if DUI was the real reason. The stop then ripened into probable cause for arrest based on bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, the admission of drinking, and six clues on field sobriety tests. The portable breath test reading of .091 can be considered in the probable-cause determination, but Pennsylvania law generally does not permit PBT results to prove BAC at trial; the trial proof must come from a valid blood test or other admissible evidence. The stop and arrest are lawful.
2. Should the .14% blood result be suppressed? Discuss consent, warrant, and exigency.
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Yes. A blood draw is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Under Birchfield v. North Dakota, the government may not justify a warrantless blood draw as a search incident to arrest, and under Missouri v. McNeely, exigency must be evaluated case by case. Ruiz refused the test, so there was no consent. The trooper did not obtain a warrant and pointed to no exigency-no accident, no inability to obtain a warrant, no dissipation emergency beyond the ordinary alcohol-metabolism rationale that McNeely rejected. The Pennsylvania implied-consent warning does not supply consent when the driver refuses. The good-faith exception does not save the search because Birchfield clearly prohibited this practice. The blood result should be suppressed. The Commonwealth may still prosecute general impairment under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) using the field tests, driving, and admissions, but the highest-rate count requires a valid BAC and cannot rest on the suppressed result.
3. Should Ruiz's station statement be suppressed, and does the 400-day delay require dismissal under Rule 600?
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Miranda applies to custodial interrogation. Ruiz was in custody at the station, but the statement 'I only had two beers; I'm not drunk' may have been volunteered or made during routine booking. If it was in response to questioning, it must be suppressed; if spontaneous, it is admissible. The 400-day delay is the stronger issue. Pennsylvania Rule 600 requires the Commonwealth to bring a defendant to trial within 365 days from the complaint, excluding time attributable to the defendant or other excludable periods. The three-day bail-processing custody is not a defendant-caused delay. If the Commonwealth cannot identify excludable time, the 400-day delay violates Rule 600. The remedy is dismissal of the charges, and the court should also consider the Barker v. Wingo constitutional speedy-trial factors. The motion to dismiss should be granted unless the Commonwealth proves sufficient excludable time.