Human Factors and Crew Resource Management
This domain tests whether you understand that most RPAS accidents start with a decision, not a component. The exam looks for specific human-factors models applied to small crews.
Frameworks to know
- SHELL model: Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware interacting around the central human.
- Dirty Dozen: fatigue, complacency, distraction, lack of communication, lack of resources, pressure, lack of teamwork, lack of awareness, lack of knowledge, assertiveness, stress, norms.
- IMSAFE self-check: illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue, emotion.
Crew dynamics in RPAS
A two- or three-person crew (pilot, observer, payload operator) still needs a briefing, agreed roles, a sterile period for takeoff and landing, and a challenge-and-response culture where a junior observer can call "stop". Automation bias, authority gradient and plan continuation bias are the recurring failures: the pilot continues because the mission was approved, not because conditions are still acceptable.
Worked example
A single pilot flying and also watching for bystanders is approached by a spectator mid-approach. Attention splits, the descent rate goes unchecked, and the aircraft touches down on uneven ground. Reasoning: workload plus distraction plus no dedicated observer exceeds capacity. Controls are a briefed sterile period, a marked cordon, and a nominated person to handle the public.
Traps
Assuming automation removes human error; treating CRM as relevant only to airline crews; ignoring fatigue on a fifth consecutive flight day.