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The Withdrawn Bond Quote and a Confirmed Subscription

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The Withdrawn Bond Quote and a Confirmed Subscription

Blue Harbor Trust administers the Blue Harbor Peso Bond UITF, a P2.4 billion fund whose written policy values holdings at fair market value and corrects NAVPU errors above 0.50%. On Tuesday the fund accountant finds that a 7.5% corporate bond maturing in 2031, 18% of net assets, has been carried at a dealer quote of 102.50 for nine trading days after that dealer withdrew its quote. A second dealer now gives a firm bid of 94.00. Recomputing the fund would move the published NAVPU from 1.8421 to 1.7950, a 2.56% drop. The marketing desk has already confirmed a P25 million subscription at 1.8421 and the client has funded. The fund has 1,850 unitholders and no redemptions settled today. The trustee asks whether to publish the corrected NAVPU today, how to treat the subscription, and whether to notify all unitholders.

1. Evaluate the use of the withdrawn dealer quote and the fund's valuation governance. What should have happened before the error was discovered?

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A quote that the dealer has already withdrawn is not a valid fair value input. The fund cannot keep using 102.50 merely because no replacement price was loaded. The valuation hierarchy should move from an active market price to multiple dealer quotes, an independent pricing service, or a documented discounted cash-flow model with credit and liquidity adjustments. Nine trading days is far too long for a single stale quote on 18% of net assets.

The valuation committee should have flagged the missing quote on day one, obtained at least one independent price, documented the override, and compared the result with the fund's 0.50% materiality threshold. The fund accountant should not have sole discretion to carry a stale price. The root failure is a control gap: no stale-price exception report, no independent price challenge, and no escalation to the trustee. The corrected 1.7950 is more credible because it reflects a firm executable bid, though the trustee should still test whether 94.00 is representative and whether an independent valuation is needed.

2. The P25 million subscription settled at 1.8421. Explain the directional effect on units and recommend how the trustee should treat the investor and the fund.

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At 1.8421, P25 million bought about 13.571 million units. At the corrected 1.7950, it should have bought about 13.928 million units. Because the published NAVPU was overstated, the new investor received too few units and the existing unitholders were temporarily overcredited. Simply keeping the old units would transfer value from the new investor to the old holders.

The trustee should issue corrective units at no additional cost, or refund the difference, so the investor ends with the units that P25 million would have purchased at the corrected NAVPU. The correction should be documented, approved by the trustee and compliance, and applied consistently to any other subscriptions priced at the erroneous NAVPU. If the subscription is still within settlement, the trustee may cancel and reprice it. The fund must not claw back value from unrelated unitholders. The investor should receive a clear written explanation, and the trustee should confirm that the correction does not create a new misstatement or disadvantage redeeming holders.

3. What notifications, reporting, and root-cause actions are required if the corrected NAVPU is published?

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Because the error is 2.56%, well above the fund's 0.50% materiality policy, the trustee should treat it as material. It should publish the corrected NAVPU with a plain-language explanation, notify the trust committee and board, and report to the BSP under the applicable UITF rules. Unitholders should be told the cause, the effect on NAVPU, and how subscriptions and redemptions are being handled. Dealing may need to be suspended briefly until the corrected price is validated.

Root-cause actions should include an independent review of the pricing vendor, a daily stale-price and variance report, mandatory dual review of manual prices, and a valuation committee with documented minutes. The trustee should also check whether earlier NAVPUs were misstated and whether any redemptions at the old price require adjustment. Finally, it should test whether the marketing desk's confirmation process prevents subscriptions from being locked before valuation sign-off. The goal is not just to fix one bond but to prevent a repeat across all illiquid holdings.