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PNPT: Active Directory Exploitation: A/V and Egress Bypassing, Lateral and Vertical Movement, Domain Controller Compromise

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Active Directory Exploitation: A/V and Egress Bypassing, Lateral and Vertical Movement, Domain Controller Compromise

Active Directory exploitation

This domain tests the full AD kill chain after an initial foothold: evading antivirus and egress controls, moving laterally and vertically, and compromising the Domain Controller. The exam cares less about a single tool and more about a defensible path from a low-privileged user to domain dominance.

Core rules and concepts

  • Enumerate before you exploit: BloodHound, PowerView, and native tools to map users, groups, ACLs, sessions, and delegation.
  • Evade A/V with in-memory execution, AMSI bypass, LOLBins, signed binaries, and obfuscated loaders; avoid writing payloads to disk when possible.
  • Bypass egress by using allowed ports 80/443, DNS tunneling, domain fronting, or a redirector; confirm what the proxy permits before building a C2 profile.
  • Lateral movement: SMB admin shares, WMI, WinRM, PsExec, and RDP, often with pass-the-hash or overpass-the-hash.
  • Vertical movement: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, ACL abuse, unconstrained delegation, ADCS misconfigurations, and DCSync.
  • DC compromise: dump NTDS.dit or use DCSync, then prove impact without destructive changes.

Worked example

You land as a helpdesk user on a workstation. BloodHound shows GenericAll on the 'Helpdesk Admins' group. You add your user, then Kerberoast a service account with an SPN. The crack yields a password reused by a server admin. That account has local admin on a file server, where you find a Domain Admin session. You use WinRM with the harvested token, then DCSync to extract krbtgt. Reasoning: each step uses existing permissions rather than blind exploitation, and every hop is documented.

Traps that cost marks

  • Running noisy scans without checking logging or scope.
  • Assuming Domain Admin means 'done' and skipping evidence collection.
  • Breaking the client environment with unapproved persistence or destructive changes.
  • Failing to explain the attack path in the report.