Two Students Disagree About Moral Truth
In a seminar, Mei argues that torturing a child for entertainment is wrong regardless of what any culture believes. Jo argues that moral judgements are just expressions of feeling, so Mei's claim is only her preference and carries no more weight than anyone else's. Mei replies that Jo's view cannot explain why we criticise past societies, and Jo replies that Mei cannot explain why moral disagreement persists after centuries of argument. The teacher asks each to state the strongest version of the other's position before responding.
1. State the strongest version of each position, then assess which handles moral disagreement better.
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Strongest Mei (moral realism). Some moral claims are true independently of what anyone believes. Torturing a child for entertainment is wrong because it causes extreme suffering for no compensating good; this is true whether or not a majority agrees. Realism explains why moral criticism of past societies makes sense: we are not merely expressing distaste, we are claiming the earlier practice was mistaken. It also explains why moral argument feels like inquiry rather than negotiation.
Strongest Jo (expressivism). Moral utterances express attitudes and prescribe action rather than describe facts. 'Torture is wrong' means something like 'I disapprove of torture; do not do it.' This explains the persistence of disagreement better than realism does: if moral facts were discoverable, we would expect convergence, yet thoughtful people disagree after centuries. Expressivism also explains why moral language is action-guiding and why it motivates in a way bare facts do not.
Assessment. Jo handles disagreement somewhat better on the surface, but the advantage is weaker than it looks. Realists have explanations for persistent disagreement: the issues are complex, interests bias judgement, and evidence is hard to obtain. Jo faces a harder problem: expressivism struggles to explain moral error. If Jo says torture is wrong, she seems to mean that someone who tortures is mistaken, not merely different. Expressivism must either reinterpret such judgements or accept that moral criticism is only pressure. Mei's position preserves the criticism but owes an account of how moral facts are known. On balance, Mei handles the criticism of past societies better, which is the more demanding explanatory task.
2. Explain what each position would need to show to be rationally preferable, and whether the disagreement can be resolved by argument.
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Each position should be judged by explanatory power, consistency and fit with how moral practice actually works.
Mei would need to show: (1) a plausible account of how moral truths are known, since she claims they are independent of belief; (2) that realism explains moral progress better than rival views, for example the abolition of slavery as discovery rather than changing taste; (3) that her account does not merely posit facts to match her intuitions.
Jo would need to show: (1) that expressivism can make sense of moral error and of arguing that a society's attitude is wrong, not just different; (2) that it can explain the apparent objectivity of moral reasoning without quietly reintroducing moral facts; (3) that it does not collapse into the view that whoever feels most strongly wins.
Can argument resolve it? Partly. Conceptual questions, such as whether expressivism can account for error, can be settled by argument and counterexample. Empirical questions, such as whether moral disagreement persists because of bias or because there is no fact, can be informed by psychology and history. But a residual disagreement may remain about which explanatory virtues matter most, and that is a further evaluative commitment.
A reasonable conclusion is that the debate is rationally tractable but not guaranteed to end in agreement. Both students should specify in advance what evidence would shift them, which is what distinguishes reasoned inquiry from trading assertions.