SACE Stage 2 Philosophy cheat sheet

Metaphysics asks what exists and what it is like; ontology catalogues entities, while metaphysics also asks what grounds them (e.g. substances, properties, events, processes).

Validity concerns form, soundness concerns form plus true premises: an argument can be valid with false premises, but sound only if every premise is true and the form valid.

Deductive arguments aim at conclusions guaranteed by premises; inductive arguments make conclusions probable; abductive arguments infer the best explanation among competitors.

A priori knowledge is justified independently of experience (e.g. mathematics, definitions); a posteriori knowledge depends on sensory or empirical evidence.

The tripartite analysis defines knowledge as justified true belief; Gettier-style cases show justified true belief can fail to be knowledge when luck connects belief and truth.

Foundationalism holds some beliefs are basic and non-inferentially justified; coherentism holds justification comes from mutual support within a belief system; reliabilism ties justification to truth-conducive belief-forming processes.

Ethical cognitivism holds moral statements express truth-apt beliefs; non-cognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism) holds they express attitudes or commands rather than beliefs.

Consequentialist theories evaluate acts by outcomes (utilitarianism: maximise total or average welfare); deontological theories evaluate acts by duties and rules independent of outcomes; virtue ethics evaluates character traits and practical wisdom.

Hume's is-ought gap: purely descriptive premises about what is the case do not entail prescriptive conclusions about what ought to be done without an evaluative premise.

Reconstruct an argument by identifying its conclusion, then its premises, then supplying unstated assumptions (enthymemes) needed to make the inference valid or strong.

Indicator words: 'therefore', 'thus', 'hence', 'so' typically mark conclusions; 'because', 'since', 'given that', 'for' typically mark premises.

Formal fallacies include affirming the consequent (If P then Q; Q; therefore P) and denying the antecedent (If P then Q; not P; therefore not Q); both are invalid.

Informal fallacies include ad hominem (attacking the arguer), straw man (misrepresenting a position), false dilemma (presenting two options when more exist), and appeal to authority where the authority is irrelevant or contested.

Begging the question occurs when a premise presupposes the conclusion; circular reasoning is a special case where support loops back to the conclusion itself.

Counterexample method: to show an argument form is invalid, produce a substitution instance with true premises and a false conclusion.

Necessary condition: without it the outcome cannot occur (P requires it); sufficient condition: its presence guarantees the outcome (it is enough for it); one condition may be necessary but not sufficient.

Correlation does not establish causation; causal claims need mechanisms, temporal ordering, and control of confounders, or evidence from controlled comparison.

Strength of inductive arguments varies by sample size, representativeness, and base rates; statistical generalisations from biased samples are weak regardless of vividness.

A philosophical position states a thesis plus supporting reasons and anticipates the strongest objection with a response; a thesis alone is not an argument.

Standard objection-response structure: state the objection in its strongest form (principle of charity), then concede, rebut, or revise the thesis rather than ignore the objection.

Thought experiments (e.g. trolley cases, brain-in-a-vat, ship of Theseus) test principles by eliciting intuitions; a defensible position explains why the intuition should be trusted or discounted.

Reflective equilibrium: adjust particular judgements and general principles until they cohere, revising whichever is less defensible under pressure.

Moral particularism denies that principles are necessary for reasoning; generalism holds that principles guide and justify action even if defeasible.

Practical reasoning moves from a goal and a belief about means to an intention or action; a sound practical argument needs a defensible end plus accurate empirical premises about the means.

When defending a position, distinguish descriptive claims (what is the case), normative claims (what ought to be), and meta-level claims (what moral language means); conflating them weakens the argument.

Criteria for evaluating competing positions: internal consistency, explanatory power, fit with considered judgements, simplicity, and resistance to counterexamples.

Metaphysics asks what exists and what it is like; ontology catalogues entities, while metaphysics also asks what grounds them (e.g. substances, properties, events, processes).

Validity concerns form, soundness concerns form plus true premises: an argument can be valid with false premises, but sound only if every premise is true and the form valid.

Deductive arguments aim at conclusions guaranteed by premises; inductive arguments make conclusions probable; abductive arguments infer the best explanation among competitors.

A priori knowledge is justified independently of experience (e.g. mathematics, definitions); a posteriori knowledge depends on sensory or empirical evidence.

The tripartite analysis defines knowledge as justified true belief; Gettier-style cases show justified true belief can fail to be knowledge when luck connects belief and truth.

Foundationalism holds some beliefs are basic and non-inferentially justified; coherentism holds justification comes from mutual support within a belief system; reliabilism ties justification to truth-conducive belief-forming processes.

Ethical cognitivism holds moral statements express truth-apt beliefs; non-cognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism) holds they express attitudes or commands rather than beliefs.

Consequentialist theories evaluate acts by outcomes (utilitarianism: maximise total or average welfare); deontological theories evaluate acts by duties and rules independent of outcomes; virtue ethics evaluates character traits and practical wisdom.

Hume's is-ought gap: purely descriptive premises about what is the case do not entail prescriptive conclusions about what ought to be done without an evaluative premise.

Reconstruct an argument by identifying its conclusion, then its premises, then supplying unstated assumptions (enthymemes) needed to make the inference valid or strong.

Indicator words: 'therefore', 'thus', 'hence', 'so' typically mark conclusions; 'because', 'since', 'given that', 'for' typically mark premises.

Formal fallacies include affirming the consequent (If P then Q; Q; therefore P) and denying the antecedent (If P then Q; not P; therefore not Q); both are invalid.

Informal fallacies include ad hominem (attacking the arguer), straw man (misrepresenting a position), false dilemma (presenting two options when more exist), and appeal to authority where the authority is irrelevant or contested.

Begging the question occurs when a premise presupposes the conclusion; circular reasoning is a special case where support loops back to the conclusion itself.

Counterexample method: to show an argument form is invalid, produce a substitution instance with true premises and a false conclusion.

Necessary condition: without it the outcome cannot occur (P requires it); sufficient condition: its presence guarantees the outcome (it is enough for it); one condition may be necessary but not sufficient.

Correlation does not establish causation; causal claims need mechanisms, temporal ordering, and control of confounders, or evidence from controlled comparison.

Strength of inductive arguments varies by sample size, representativeness, and base rates; statistical generalisations from biased samples are weak regardless of vividness.

A philosophical position states a thesis plus supporting reasons and anticipates the strongest objection with a response; a thesis alone is not an argument.

Standard objection-response structure: state the objection in its strongest form (principle of charity), then concede, rebut, or revise the thesis rather than ignore the objection.

Thought experiments (e.g. trolley cases, brain-in-a-vat, ship of Theseus) test principles by eliciting intuitions; a defensible position explains why the intuition should be trusted or discounted.

Reflective equilibrium: adjust particular judgements and general principles until they cohere, revising whichever is less defensible under pressure.

Moral particularism denies that principles are necessary for reasoning; generalism holds that principles guide and justify action even if defeasible.

Practical reasoning moves from a goal and a belief about means to an intention or action; a sound practical argument needs a defensible end plus accurate empirical premises about the means.

When defending a position, distinguish descriptive claims (what is the case), normative claims (what ought to be), and meta-level claims (what moral language means); conflating them weakens the argument.

Criteria for evaluating competing positions: internal consistency, explanatory power, fit with considered judgements, simplicity, and resistance to counterexamples.