CSPCC flashcards
CSPCC · Build recall with a focused review session.
32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Shared responsibility model
- Division of security duties between cloud provider and customer. Provider secures physical facilities, hardware, and managed-service internals; customer secures data, identities, configurations, and, in IaaS, the guest operating system.
- Defense in depth
- Layering independent controls so failure of one does not expose the asset. In cloud design this means combining identity, network, encryption, and monitoring controls rather than relying on a single perimeter.
- Zero trust architecture
- Model that grants no implicit trust based on network location. Every request is authenticated, authorized, and encrypted, with continuous verification and least-privilege access decisions.
- Blast radius
- Scope of impact if a component is compromised. Cloud architects reduce it by isolating accounts, environments, and network zones so lateral movement is contained.
- Risk register
- Record of identified risks with owner, likelihood, impact, existing controls, residual rating, and treatment decision. Cloud entries should include provider dependency and misconfiguration scenarios.
- Residual risk
- Risk remaining after controls are applied. It must be compared against the organization's risk appetite and formally accepted by an authorized owner when it exceeds tolerance.
- Policy hierarchy
- Ordered set of governance documents: policy states intent, standards state mandatory requirements, procedures give steps, guidelines are recommendations. Cloud rules should exist at each level.
- Concentration risk
- Exposure from depending heavily on one provider, region, or service. Mitigations include documented exit plans, portable data formats, and tested alternate-region capability.
- Least privilege
- Granting only the permissions needed for a task, for the shortest time. In cloud IAM this means narrow actions on specific resources with conditions, reviewed regularly.
- Role assumption
- Mechanism where a principal obtains temporary credentials for a role via a trust policy. It replaces long-lived access keys and produces auditable, time-limited sessions.
- Federated identity
- Trust relationship letting an external identity provider authenticate users or workloads. SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect are common; SCIM handles automated provisioning and deprovisioning.
- Phishing-resistant MFA
- Authentication bound to origin, such as FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys or passkeys. It resists real-time relay attacks that defeat one-time codes and push approvals.
- Envelope encryption
- Pattern where a data key encrypts the data and a key encryption key wraps the data key. Rotation and access control apply to the wrapping key in a KMS or HSM.
- Crypto-shredding
- Destroying encryption keys so ciphertext becomes unrecoverable. It supports erasure requests but requires key design per tenant or per data subject.
- Data minimization
- Privacy principle limiting collection to what is necessary for a stated purpose. Cloud implementations require inventory of stores, retention limits, and deletion propagation to replicas.
- Data residency
- Requirement that data remain within specified geographic or legal boundaries. Enforced through region-pinned storage, tenant isolation, and controls on replication and support access.
- Security group vs NACL
- Security groups are stateful and attached to resources; network ACLs are stateless and applied at subnet level. Both should default to deny with explicit allow rules.
- Private endpoint
- Interface that connects a virtual network to a provider service without traversing the public internet. It reduces exposure and supports data-exfiltration controls.
- Instance metadata service
- Endpoint exposing credentials and configuration to a running instance. It must require session tokens and be blocked from workloads that do not need it, to prevent SSRF credential theft.
- Origin shielding
- Configuration ensuring a CDN or WAF is the only path to the origin. The origin accepts traffic solely from the edge, preventing direct-to-origin bypass of protections.
- Pipeline credential federation
- Using OIDC trust so CI/CD jobs obtain short-lived cloud credentials instead of stored keys. It removes long-lived secrets from build systems and logs.
- Policy as code
- Expressing guardrails in machine-readable rules evaluated in pipelines and at runtime. It blocks noncompliant infrastructure before deployment and detects drift afterward.
- Software bill of materials
- Machine-readable inventory of components and dependencies in an artifact. It supports rapid identification of affected systems when a supply-chain vulnerability is disclosed.
- Secret scanning
- Automated detection of credentials committed to repositories or build logs. Findings require immediate revocation, because removing the commit does not invalidate the exposed secret.
- Control-plane audit log
- Record of management API activity showing who changed what and when. It is a primary detection source for IAM changes, key deletion, and public exposure events.
- Incident containment in cloud
- Limiting damage using API actions: revoke credentials, disable keys, isolate instances with security groups, and snapshot volumes before termination for later analysis.
- MTTD and MTTR
- Mean time to detect and mean time to respond. These operation metrics measure detection and recovery effectiveness and depend on log coverage and tested runbooks.
- Chain of custody
- Documented, tamper-evident record of evidence handling from collection through presentation. Cloud forensics requires hashing snapshots and logging every access to evidence.
- SOC 2 Type II
- Assurance report on operating effectiveness of controls over a period against trust services criteria. Customers must still evaluate complementary user entity controls and report scope.
- Complementary user entity controls
- Controls a provider assumes the customer implements for the overall control environment to work. They appear in assurance reports and must be mapped to the customer's own controls.
- Data processing agreement
- Contract governing processing of personal data on behalf of a controller. It specifies purpose, security measures, subprocessors, breach notification, and deletion obligations.
- Legal hold
- Obligation to preserve data relevant to litigation or investigation. It suspends normal deletion and retention schedules and must extend to backups and third-party stores.