Cisco SPVI 300-515 cheat sheet
Cisco SPVI 300-515 · Keep the key ideas within reach.
Service-provider VPN architecture and underlay dependencies
Service type determines provider routing participation.
Underlay reachability and service forwarding are distinct.
Transport and service labels have different roles.
Inter-provider requirements depend on the actual architecture option.
Layer2 provider services, pseudowires and EVPN
Match attachment, topology and encapsulation to the service intent.
Pseudowire signaling and underlay transport solve different problems.
EVPN control-plane reachability does not prove every data path.
MTU, loops and redundancy need the actual supported model.
VRFs, route policy and IPv6 provider VPNs
VRF context, route distinguishers and route targets have different roles.
Received BGP routes still need selection, import and forwarding resolution.
IPv6 customer VPN service does not imply every core device stores customer IPv6 routes.
Inter-AS family requirements and command syntax depend on the actual option/platform.
Identity, access and cryptographic protection
Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.
MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.
RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.
Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.
Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.
Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.
ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.
Network boundaries and protected communication
Internet-facing services belong in a DMZ; data stores sit in a filtered internal zone.
VLANs alone are not a trust boundary - add DAI, private VLANs and 802.1 X.
IPsec AH gives integrity only; ESP adds confidentiality.
IDS is passive and alerts; IPS is inline and blocks.
NAT is not a security control and temporary rules must be removed.
Security operations, monitoring and response
Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.
Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.
Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.
Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.
Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.
Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.
Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.
Continuity, backup and technical recovery
Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.
A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.
A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.
Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.