Citrix CCA-AppDS cheat sheet

Virtual-server, service-group, server and monitor roles differ.

Content switching and backend selection are related stages.

Address and policy behavior require the actual routing and bind context.

A supported certificate and change workflow needs end-to-end verification.

Gateway access mode and resource authorization are separate.

nFactor decisions need actual policy and schema context.

Federation assertions and launch tickets have different roles.

Investigate the failed stage without exposing credentials or disrupting users.

Policy scope, profile checks and signature patterns are different.

Learned observations need trusted review before relaxation.

Transformation, reputation and bot labels do not guarantee protection.

Validate application behavior and controlled rollout separately from command success.

Separate front-end and backend connection contexts.

A monitor proves only its configured observation.

Persistence is different from application session storage.

Routing, source translation and TLS need a complete path model.

Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.

MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.

RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.

Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.

Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.

Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.

ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.

Internet-facing services belong in a DMZ; data stores sit in a filtered internal zone.

VLANs alone are not a trust boundary - add DAI, private VLANs and 802.1 X.

IPsec AH gives integrity only; ESP adds confidentiality.

IDS is passive and alerts; IPS is inline and blocks.

NAT is not a security control and temporary rules must be removed.

Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.

Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.

Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.

Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.

Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.

Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.

Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.

Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.

A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.

A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.

Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.