Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Anthropology
Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Anthropology examines the relation between mind and body, consciousness, personal identity, and what distinguishes human beings. GCE questions typically ask you to compare dualism, behaviourism, identity theory and functionalism, and to assess freedom, reason and sociality in human nature.
Dualism
Descartes' substance dualism holds that mind is an immaterial thinking substance and body an extended substance. The interaction problem asks how two radically different substances causally affect each other. Occasionalism (Malebranche) and pre-established harmony (Leibniz) avoid interaction; epiphenomenalism makes mental events by-products of physical events.
Materialism
Behaviourism (Ryle) denies an inner ghost; mental talk describes dispositions to behave. Ryle calls the dualist picture a category mistake. Identity theory holds that mental states are brain states; critics cite multiple realizability. Functionalism defines mental states by causal roles rather than physical composition, allowing minds in non-biological systems; critics cite qualia and Searle's Chinese Room.
Consciousness and personal identity
Qualia are subjective felt qualities; the 'hard problem' asks why physical processes are accompanied by experience. Personal identity: Locke's memory criterion, bodily continuity, psychological continuity, narrative identity. Philosophical anthropology: Aristotle defines humans as rational animals; Sartre says existence precedes essence and humans are condemned to be free; Marx emphasises labour and social relations.
Worked example
Descartes argues: the body is divisible, but the mind is indivisible; if mind and body were identical, they would share all properties (Leibniz's law); therefore they are distinct. The reasoning is a property argument. A critic replies that the mind's indivisibility is questionable - split-brain cases and divided attention suggest fragmentation - and that 'divisible' may not apply to mind in the same sense as to body. The argument therefore needs a defensible premise about mental properties.
Traps
Dualism is not simply belief in a soul; it is a metaphysical thesis about substances. Materialism is not the same as behaviourism, and functionalism is not identity theory. Functionalism does not say the mind is the brain; it says mental states are defined by causal role. Locke's memory criterion faces circularity and transitivity problems. Sartre is not a nihilist who denies all values; he insists on radical freedom and responsibility.