CrowdStrike CCSA flashcards
CrowdStrike CCSA · Build recall with a focused review session.
32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Shared responsibility model
- Division of security duties between cloud provider and customer. Provider secures facilities, hardware, and managed-service internals; customer secures identity, configuration, data, and workload contents.
- AWS account boundary
- The primary isolation, quota, and billing unit in AWS. Resources in separate accounts are isolated by default, and cross-account access requires explicit trust such as role assumption.
- Availability Zone
- An isolated datacenter group within a region with independent power and networking. Subnets are bound to one zone, so multi-zone design is required for resilience.
- Azure resource hierarchy
- Tenant, management group, subscription, resource group, resource. RBAC assignments and Azure Policy inherit downward, so scope choice determines blast radius of a policy or permission.
- GCP project hierarchy
- Organization, folder, project, resource. IAM policies inherit down this tree, and a grant at organization level applies to every project beneath it.
- Service control policy
- AWS Organizations guardrail that sets the maximum available permissions for member accounts. It does not grant permissions; it filters what identity policies can allow.
- Immutable infrastructure
- Pattern where servers are replaced rather than patched in place. It makes instance identity ephemeral, so durable asset tracking must key on resource IDs, not hostnames or IPs.
- Cloud control plane logs
- Provider audit records of API activity: AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log, GCP Cloud Audit Logs. They show who called which API, from where, and with what result.
- CSPM
- Cloud security posture management. Continuously evaluates deployed cloud configuration against benchmarks and policy, producing misconfiguration findings with severity and resource context.
- CIEM
- Cloud infrastructure entitlement management. Analyzes effective permissions and usage to identify over-privileged identities, unused entitlements, and risky cross-account trust relationships.
- CWPP
- Cloud workload protection platform. Secures running compute such as virtual machines, containers, and serverless by inspecting runtime behavior and enabling prevention and response actions.
- Effective permissions
- The net result of identity policy, resource policy, permission boundaries, and organization guardrails. Any applicable explicit deny overrides every allow in the evaluation.
- Least privilege
- Granting only the permissions required for a task, for the shortest feasible duration. In cloud this usually means scoped roles and short-lived credentials instead of long-lived access keys.
- Customer-managed key
- Encryption key created and controlled by the customer in a key management service. It enables revocation, rotation control, and separation of duties beyond provider-managed keys.
- Defense in depth
- Layering independent controls so one failure does not expose the asset. Cloud layers include identity, network, workload runtime, data encryption, and monitoring.
- Compliance control mapping
- Linking each technical finding or safeguard to framework requirements such as SOC 2 or PCI DSS. One finding can satisfy or violate multiple controls simultaneously.
- Public storage exposure
- A storage bucket or container readable by anonymous principals. Severity depends on data sensitivity and policy; sensitive data plus public read is a critical condition.
- Agentless cloud assessment
- Snapshot-based evaluation of cloud APIs and disk images on a schedule. It delivers posture and vulnerability context without installing software, but cannot block runtime activity.
- Falcon sensor visibility
- Continuous host-level telemetry covering process, file, and network events. It enables real-time detection and prevention, which agentless periodic scanning cannot provide.
- Cloud account registration
- Onboarding a cloud account or subscription using read-only roles or service principals. The configured scope determines which regions and resource types are assessed.
- Unified asset inventory
- Normalized record of resources across AWS, Azure, and GCP so consistent policy and misconfiguration rules apply regardless of provider-specific naming.
- IaC scanning
- Static analysis of infrastructure-as-code templates before deployment. It catches misconfiguration pre-provisioning but does not detect drift in already-deployed resources.
- Configuration drift
- Divergence between intended and deployed resource state. Detecting it requires repeated assessment over time; a single scan only proves point-in-time state.
- Exploitability prioritization
- Ranking findings by real-world risk signals such as internet exposure, sensitive data, and known-exploited vulnerability status, rather than raw severity score alone.
- Orphaned resource finding
- A misconfiguration on an unused or decommissioned resource. It remains a hygiene issue but typically ranks below the same finding on an active, internet-facing asset.
- Cloud incident containment
- Isolating a compromised workload by network controls such as quarantine security groups before remediation. Isolation limits spread while preserving the host for investigation.
- Evidence preservation order
- Snapshot disk and capture memory before terminating or rebuilding a workload. Termination destroys volatile evidence and prevents root-cause analysis.
- Credential revocation scope
- Rotating access keys, revoking active sessions, removing added trust policies, and checking for new identities. Password reset alone leaves cloud persistence intact.
- Real-time response actions
- Host-level actions executed through the sensor, including network containment, process termination, file quarantine, and memory capture, applied to a live workload.
- Identity correlation
- Linking runtime events to the IAM principal that launched or accessed the workload. It separates legitimate administrative action from attacker-driven activity during triage.
- Log retention window
- The period provider audit and flow logs remain queryable. Short retention directly caps how far back an investigation can reconstruct attacker activity.
- Post-incident hardening
- Closing the initial access vector, such as an exposed key or over-privileged role, before returning the workload to production. It prevents immediate recompromise by the same path.