CyberArk Defender - Identity flashcards
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32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Vault master policy
- The top-level policy in CyberArk PAM that sets platform-wide defaults such as password change intervals, dual control, session recording, and required reason; platform and account policies can override it for exceptions.
- Safe permissions
- The set of rights granted to a user or group inside a Safe, including Use, Retrieve, List, Add, Update, Delete, and Manage Safe Members; they determine what actions are allowed on accounts in that Safe.
- Dual control
- A CyberArk policy requiring two authorized approvers to confirm a request before a user can retrieve or connect to a privileged account; it is configured in master or platform policy and enforced at retrieve time.
- CPM rotation
- The Central Policy Manager changes privileged account passwords on a schedule defined by the platform or master policy, verifies the new credential works, and reconciles it back into the Vault.
- PSM session recording
- The Privileged Session Manager proxies connections to target systems, records the session, and indexes recordings by user, target, and time so privileged activity can be audited and reviewed.
- Just-in-time elevation
- A model where a user receives time-bound access to a Safe or account only when needed, instead of standing privileges; access expires automatically at the end of the approved window.
- Vault authentication methods
- CyberArk supports password, LDAP, RADIUS, SAML/SSO, smart card, and PKI authentication; each is configured as a method in the Vault, and MFA can be required for specific users or directories.
- Vault audit trail
- Every retrieve, connect, and change in CyberArk is written to the Vault audit log; the records support privileged activity reporting, compliance evidence, and forwarding to a SIEM.
- Conjur policy YAML
- Secrets Manager (Conjur) defines its policy tree, hosts, and variables in declarative YAML loaded into the server; permit statements in that policy grant each host read access to specific variables.
- Conjur JWT authenticator
- A Secrets Manager authenticator that lets a workload present a platform-issued JWT, such as a Kubernetes service account token, and exchange it for a short-lived Conjur access token.
- Dynamic secrets
- Credentials generated on demand with a short TTL, such as database accounts; the workload requests one, uses it, and it expires, which removes long-lived static secrets from the environment.
- Secret rotation workflow
- Secrets Manager can rotate a machine credential on a schedule or trigger, write the new value to the target system, and update the stored secret in the same automated workflow.
- Secrets sprawl
- Hardcoded credentials scattered across source code, configs, and CI pipelines; remediation means discovering them, migrating them into Secrets Manager, and injecting them at runtime instead.
- Conjur host identity
- A workload registered in the Conjur policy tree as a host; it authenticates with its platform identity and is granted read access only to the variables its role permits.
- Orphaned machine identity
- A workload host or API key with no current owner and no rotation policy; it is a common audit finding because live credentials remain usable after the owning team or application is gone.
- Conjur leader and followers
- A high-availability deployment where the leader holds authoritative policy and secret data and followers serve requests; the cluster sits behind TLS for transport protection.
- Agent as first-class identity
- An AI agent should be registered with its own identity, owner, purpose, and scoped access rather than sharing a human or service account, so its actions can be attributed and governed.
- Short-lived agent credentials
- Agents should obtain their own short-lived credentials through a workload identity mechanism; long-lived API keys embedded in agent code are the primary risk to eliminate.
- Agent least privilege scope
- An agent's permissions should cover only the tools, APIs, and data it needs; broad standing permissions turn a prompt-injection or model error into a full-privilege incident.
- Policy enforcement point
- A broker that checks an agent's identity and the requested action before issuing a credential or forwarding a tool call, so agent access is mediated rather than direct.
- Human-in-the-loop approval
- A control for high-impact agent actions: the agent requests the action, a human approves it, and the approval is logged with the agent identity and request context.
- Agent action logging
- Agent sessions should be logged with the agent identity, the initiating user or trigger, the tools invoked, and the data accessed, enabling audit and anomaly detection.
- Prompt injection risk
- Untrusted content can cause an agent to misuse its credentials; input trust boundaries and output validation are therefore part of the agent identity control set.
- Agent lifecycle management
- Register, provision scoped credentials, monitor, rotate, and deprovision on retirement; an orphaned agent identity with live credentials is an unmonitored privileged account.
- Delegated authority intersection
- When an agent acts for a user, effective permission is the intersection of the user's rights and the agent's scope, not the union, and the delegation chain must be recorded.
- EPM elevation policy
- A rule that decides whether a standard user may run a specific application elevated; it can auto-elevate signed apps, require justification, or require approval before execution.
- EPM application control rules
- Rules can match by hash, publisher, or path; hash is strictest, publisher survives application updates, and path is weakest and most easily abused by attackers.
- Access certification
- A periodic review in which reviewers confirm or revoke entitlements; decisions must be remediated and evidenced, and privileged items such as Safe memberships should be reviewed first.
- Segregation of duties
- A governance check that detects conflicting access combinations, such as a user who can both request and approve the same privileged access; violations are flagged for remediation.
- Joiner-mover-leaver governance
- Lifecycle management ties HR events to entitlement changes: a leaver's Safe memberships, Vault accounts, and EPM elevation rights must be revoked as part of offboarding.
- EPM local admin removal
- Endpoint Privilege Manager removes local administrator rights from standard users and replaces them with policy-based elevation of specific applications, recording each elevation event for audit.
- Governance metrics loop
- Certification completion rates, segregation-of-duties violations, and orphaned accounts are tracked as metrics and fed back into policy tuning to close the governance loop.