CyberArk Trustee cheat sheet
CyberArk Trustee · Keep the key ideas within reach.
Traditional PAM architecture, safes and accountable access
A central Vault does not mean no authorized component ever handles a secret.
Safe membership, platform behavior and request conditions serve different purposes.
Approval counts and effective permissions require the actual configuration.
Discovery, onboarding, rotation, access and tested recovery are separate evidence.
Privileged sessions, rotation and application-secret dependencies
Session brokering, credential change, verification and reconciliation are distinct.
Actual integrations determine which permissions and accounts an operation uses.
Consumers need supported credential-refresh and failure behavior.
Runtime retrieval alone does not prevent secret leakage through the consumer.
Endpoint privilege, application rules and controlled deployment
Elevate an authorized task rather than grant standing privilege by default.
Verify assignment, agent state, effective matches and actual precedence.
Hash, publisher and path criteria have different trust and update trade-offs.
Product/version terminology and current certification availability need separate verification.
Identity, access and cryptographic protection
Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.
MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.
RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.
Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.
Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.
Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.
ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.
Security operations, monitoring and response
Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.
Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.
Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.
Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.
Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.
Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.
Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.
Continuity, backup and technical recovery
Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.
A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.
A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.
Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.
Cyber-risk identification and analysis
Risk assessment cycles through identification, analysis, and evaluation, producing a maintained risk register
Single loss expectancy = asset value x exposure factor; annualized loss expectancy = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence
Risk requires a threat, a vulnerability, and an impact; none alone is sufficient
Inherent risk is before controls, residual risk after them - always state which is being scored
Control effectiveness and uncertainty affect any expected-loss comparison.