Cold War, division and European integration (1945–1990)
This domain asks how the anti-Hitler coalition collapsed into a bipolar confrontation, how the two German states were built into rival blocs, and how West European integration and later détente managed that conflict until 1989–90.
Core rules and concepts
- Bloc formation: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 1947, Cominform 1947, Berlin Blockade and airlift 1948–49, NATO 1949, Grundgesetz (23 May 1949) and GDR constitution (7 October 1949), Warsaw Pact 1955, Hallstein Doctrine 1955.
- German-German flashpoints: 17 June 1953 uprising, Berlin Wall 13 August 1961, the Zwei-Staaten-Theorie of the 1970s.
- Détente: Egon Bahr's 1963 formula "Wandel durch Annäherung"; Brandt's Ostpolitik - Moscow Treaty 1970, Warsaw Treaty 1970 with the recognition of the Oder–Neisse line, Basic Treaty 1972, Helsinki Final Act 1975 (baskets, human rights, Basket III).
- Integration: ECSC 1951 (Schuman Plan), Treaties of Rome 1957 (EEC and Euratom), merger treaty 1965, Single European Act 1986, Maastricht 1992. Deepening (supranationality, qualified majority) versus widening (British accession 1973) is a permanent tension.
- Endgame: reform pressure in the GDR, Monday demonstrations, 9 November 1989, Ten-Point Programme, currency union 1990, Two-Plus-Four Treaty, unification on 3 October 1990 (Article 23 GG).
Worked example
Assess Bahr's 1963 dictum: "Wandel durch Annäherung." Reasoning: (1) Meaning: contact and recognition of the status quo should erode the GDR from within, not overthrow it. (2) Conditions: it presupposed a firm Western alliance (CDU criticism: recognition legitimises the SED). (3) Evidence: Basic Treaty 1972 regularised contacts; Helsinki 1975 gave dissidents a legal reference point; yet the SED stabilised itself with Western credits in the 1980s. (4) Judgement: the policy's causal contribution to 1989 is indirect and long-term; avoiding over-attribution earns the marks.
Traps that cost marks
- Conflating détente with the end of bloc confrontation.
- Mixing up ECSC (1951), EEC (1957) and EU (1993, after Maastricht).
- Narrating integration as linear progress without the Empty Chair Crisis (1965) or eurosclerosis.
- Claiming Ostpolitik "caused" 1989 without weighing Gorbachev's role and GDR internal dynamics.