Ransomware Deleted the Only Backup Copy

First contain: isolate affected production segments and disable the shared administrative account, but do not power off or rebuild the backup appliance until forensic images and logs are preserved. Preserve the backup server, appliance logs, authentication logs, and the isolated network configuration, because deleting them destroys the evidence needed to determine which backups are clean. Next determine the last known-good restore point before encryption, using file metadata and CyberSense-style analytics if available, and restore order processing first to a clean隔离 segment, not to the infected network. Rebuild credentials and the backup server in a separate security domain before reconnecting. Do not restore from any backup that was accessible to the compromised account until it is validated. The order matters because restoring into an infected network can re-encrypt the recovery, and reusing compromised credentials can delete the restored copy. The 12-hour RTO is aggressive; prioritize the minimum order-processing tier, then expand.

Separate the backup infrastructure from the production Active Directory domain and use dedicated, least-privilege accounts with MFA. Remove shared administrative accounts and require individual accountability. Put the backup appliance behind a management network that is not routable from production, and restrict backup traffic to required ports and hosts. Enable retention lock in governance or compliance mode for the required retention period, with a documented exception process rather than disabling it for convenience. Add an isolated Cyber Recovery vault with an air gap, retention-locked copies, and analytics such as CyberSense to detect anomalies in backup data. Keep at least one copy offline or immutable so a compromised credential cannot delete all copies. Monitor and alert to a staffed channel with an escalation path; a shared mailbox is not monitoring. Test recovery from the vault, including credential rebuild and clean-network restore. These controls address identity, network segmentation, immutability, isolation, detection, and response.

Evidence should show operation, not purchase. Provide access reviews showing removal of shared accounts, MFA enforcement, and least-privilege role assignments. Provide retention-lock configuration and a sample of locked copies with expiry dates, plus the exception log showing no unauthorized unlocks. Provide vault isolation test results, air-gap status, and a restore test from the vault with measured RTO and data validation. Provide monitoring alerts and the escalation record showing a real alert reached a named responder. Provide the incident timeline and post-incident changes, including the decision to preserve logs and rebuild credentials. For the board, report the recovery point achieved for the order-processing tier and the tested time to restore, not just backup success rates. Also disclose the residual risk: 40% of file servers were encrypted, and the single appliance was reachable from production. Auditors will want to see that the Cyber Recovery license is actually deployed, connected to the isolated network, and exercised on a schedule.