The Output Ceiling on Line 3
A 240-person packaging plant introduced an individual incentive plan that pays operators a bonus for every unit above a 75-unit hourly standard. In the first month, average output rose from 72 to 78 units per hour. By the third month it had fallen to 74, and supervisors reported that experienced operators were telling newcomers to "leave some for tomorrow." Informal conversations revealed a shared belief that high output would lead management to raise the standard. The plant manager wants to replace the 12 operators he calls ringleaders, restore the individual bonus, and add a weekly ranking board. You are an internal OD consultant asked to advise before any disciplinary action. The plant has no union, but shift-level crews are tight-knit and supervisors have little formal training. The manager has given you two weeks and access to production records, crew schedules, and 30-minute interviews with volunteers.
1. The plant manager says the pattern is a simple "attitude problem." Using scientific management and human relations perspectives, explain what is actually happening and whether his remedy will work.
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The pattern is not well explained by Taylor's scientific management alone. Scientific management predicts that tying pay to output will raise output if workers are economically rational and the standard is accepted. The initial rise fits, but the later decline and the "leave some for tomorrow" instruction indicate an informal group norm, the central finding of the human relations tradition. The crew is enforcing a rate ceiling to protect itself against a rate increase, a collective response to perceived managerial opportunism. Replacing 12 operators and adding a ranking board increases the threat and strengthens the norm; it may also drive the behavior underground rather than remove it. A better first move is to test whether the standard is seen as fair and whether supervisors are enforcing it inconsistently. If the norm is crew-wide, discipline aimed at individuals will be read as an attack on the group. The consultant should recommend a temporary pause on discipline, a joint review of the standard with crew representatives, and a small experiment in which one crew helps set a revised standard and receives group-level recognition.
2. What diagnostic evidence would separate a group-norm explanation from an individual-pay dissatisfaction explanation? Name two data sources and the pattern each would show.
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Use two sources that vary at the crew level. First, compare output distributions across crews: if the cap is a group norm, high-cohesion crews should cluster tightly below the standard while low-cohesion crews show wider, higher output; if the issue is individual pay dissatisfaction, output should vary with individual pay complaints rather than crew membership. Second, conduct private interviews with a random sample of operators and ask what happens when someone exceeds the standard; a norm explanation predicts consistent reports of teasing, exclusion, or informal sanctions, while a pay explanation predicts complaints about fairness and bonus size but no shared sanction. Production records alone cannot separate them because both could lower average output. A short sociometric question, such as who would you ask about the informal rules on this crew, can identify norm enforcers. The key is a predicted pattern, not just more opinions.