The Scorecard That Moved Nothing
A 14-person inbound service team handles about 900 calls a day. Management introduces a monthly customer-satisfaction bonus: each representative can earn up to $150 if the team's CSAT score exceeds 88%. Base pay is near market, and the bonus is about 5% of monthly pay. Within two months, representatives point out that roughly 30% of complaints trace to a known product defect and another 20% to shipping delays outside the team's control. The supervisor also has discretion to adjust scores after call review. Several high performers say effort will not move the score; two low performers have learned to transfer difficult calls to a queue that is excluded from the team score. CSAT has moved from 86% to 87%. Management wants to know why the incentive "failed" and whether to increase the bonus to $300.
1. Apply expectancy theory to explain why the incentive did not produce the intended effort, and evaluate the proposal to double the bonus.
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Motivation depends on expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. Expectancy is weak: representatives believe effort cannot raise CSAT because about half of complaints trace to defects and shipping delays outside their control. Instrumentality is also weak: the score is a team score, and the supervisor can adjust it after review, so individual performance may not reliably produce the bonus. Valence is modest, since $150 is about 5% of monthly pay, and for high performers it may be outweighed by the belief that the game is rigged. The two representatives who transfer difficult calls are responding rationally to the available instrumentality: transferring calls protects the score. Doubling the bonus raises valence only; it does not fix expectancy or instrumentality and may intensify gaming. Management should first remove external drivers from the score, publish a non-discretionary formula, and measure behaviors representatives control, such as first-call resolution and callback timeliness.
2. Redesign the performance system using goal-setting and job characteristics principles. What should be measured, and what safeguard should prevent the transfer problem from worsening?
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Set specific, proximal goals that representatives can affect: first-call resolution, callback within four hours, and complete documentation of product-defect reports. These goals are more controllable than a composite CSAT score, and they provide feedback within days rather than at month-end. Give representatives a role in setting the targets so they accept them, and link recognition and pay to both individual and team results. Use job characteristics to strengthen task identity and feedback: assign ownership of a case through resolution, rotate the defect-reporting liaison role, and review a short sample of calls weekly. To prevent the transfer problem, count transferred calls as part of each representative's workload and audit the excluded queue; if transfers rise while CSAT is stable, the team is gaming the metric. The safeguard should be a visible balancing measure, not a threat, so representatives can report defects without being punished for them.