Night Freight Sector After a Three-Hour Delay
At 02:40 local, a two-pilot cargo turboprop is ready to depart on a 1 h 20 min night sector. The crew reported at 22:00 for a 23:30 departure, but cargo loading slipped by three hours. The captain is on the sixth consecutive night duty, slept 4.5 h in the hotel, and has now been awake for 19.5 h. The first officer slept 5 h but has been yawning, responded slowly to two ATC calls, and twice read a checklist item from the wrong column. Destination weather is fog with visibility 600 m and RVR 550 m; the alternate has visibility 5 km and is 40 min away. Company night-duty limit is 10 h, and the crew is at 9 h 10 min. The captain says, 'I am fine once we get going,' and the aircraft has a serviceable autopilot. The operator's fatigue-risk policy allows a commander to delay or divert but does not require it.
1. Assess the crew's fitness to continue and decide whether to depart. Explain the fatigue, circadian and operational factors that drive your decision.
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Decision: do not depart with this crew as rostered; delay until both pilots have had sleep or call in a rested crew. Reasoning: the captain has been awake about 19.5 h and is in the early-morning circadian low, roughly 02:00-06:00, when vigilance and decision speed are poorest. This is the sixth consecutive night, so cumulative sleep debt is likely even if 4.5 h of hotel sleep felt adequate. The first officer's slow ATC responses and two checklist misreads are observable performance signs, not personality flaws. The duty limit is not a fitness test: at 9 h 10 min of a 10 h limit, the crew is close to the limit before a fog approach that will demand high workload and precise monitoring. The captain's 'fine once we get going' is a subjective second-wind sensation; it does not restore attention or cross-checking. The autopilot reduces manual workload but not the risk of mode errors, poor monitoring and plan continuation. Fog at 600 m visibility and RVR 550 m makes a diversion or missed approach likely. A just-culture response is to treat the delay as an operational threat, not a discipline issue, and to file a fatigue report if the roster contributed.
2. If the aircraft were already airborne and the first officer showed these signs, what threat-and-error-management actions and reporting would you take?
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Treat the first officer's signs as a threat to monitoring and challenge. First, verbalise the concern and assign a specific task: 'I am concerned about fatigue; you fly, I will manage the radios and checklists.' If the captain is more affected, transfer control only with a clear briefing. Use the autopilot at a safe level, reduce non-essential conversation, and build cross-checks into every mode and altitude change. Rebrief the approach: no continuation below minima without a stable profile, and nominate diversion triggers before starting the approach, such as any confusion, unstable at 1,000 ft in IMC, or two deviations. Do not use caffeine as a substitute for sleep; it can mask symptoms. If either pilot cannot maintain vigilance, divert to the alternate with better weather and rest. After landing, submit a fatigue report and, if applicable, a company safety report. The report should describe the delay, sleep opportunity, symptoms and decisions, not blame the first officer. This supports just culture and gives the operator data to fix rostering.