Human Factors in Aviation Operations
Human Factors in Aviation Operations
The exam tests how procedures, design and reporting systems control error at the operational level. Questions ask you to apply TEM, select the correct checklist type, or distinguish just culture from blame.
Flight deck design, SOPs and checklists
- Design: controls should be consistent, reachable and logically grouped; displays should show the right information at the right salience; error-tolerant design prevents slips becoming accidents.
- SOPs standardise behaviour, define roles and reduce variance. They are not optional; deliberate deviations need justification.
- Checklists: challenge-response (normal) and do-verify (some emergency or non-normal); read-do-verify for critical memory items. Memory items are limited to time-critical emergencies.
TEM and safety reporting
- Threat and Error Management: threats are external (weather, ATC, terrain); errors are crew actions; undesired aircraft states are the result. Countermeasures: avoid, trap, mitigate.
- Reporting: mandatory for specified occurrences; voluntary and confidential systems capture the rest. Just culture distinguishes human error from reckless or intentional violation; it does not mean no accountability.
- Safety culture needs reporting, just, flexible, learning and informed elements.
Worked example
On approach, a runway change is issued late. Threat: late change. Likely error: wrong STAR or wrong minimum. Countermeasures: brief the change, use the checklist, cross-check the FMS, call stable by the gate. If the aircraft becomes high and fast, that is an undesired aircraft state; go around. The reasoning is that TEM is prospective and iterative, not a post-accident label.
Traps
Do not treat a checklist as a memory aid to be recited from memory. Do not say just culture eliminates punishment; it still addresses recklessness. Do not assume a voluntary report is anonymous in every system; confidentiality depends on the scheme. Do not confuse a threat with an error. Do not treat SOP deviation as always acceptable because captain's judgement exists.