EASA Module 8 study materials
EASA Module 8 study resources

Sign It, We All Do It

EASA Module 8 · Put your knowledge to work in context.

All case studies

Sign It, We All Do It

A young technician has just completed a flap rigging check. The certifying engineer who supervised the work leaves early for a family emergency and asks the technician to "get the paperwork signed by whoever is around". The team leader, who is not type-rated on the aircraft, says: "Just sign it, we all do it, the check is straightforward and the aircraft needs to go tonight." The technician knows the rigging pin was removed but did not personally see the final functional test. Pressure is high: 14 people are waiting and the flight is scheduled in three hours. The technician has held his authorisation for five months.

1. What are the technician's responsibilities, and what should he do?

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The technician's responsibility is to certify only work he has personally performed or directly supervised and verified, within the limits of his authorisation. He did not see the final functional test and cannot confirm the rigging pin status from his own observation, so he cannot honestly sign a certificate of release to service for that task.

He should:

  1. Refuse to sign the certification, politely and factually: he cannot certify what he did not verify.
  2. Secure the aircraft status – ensure the rigging pin is accounted for and the functional test is completed or clearly recorded as outstanding.
  3. Escalate to the next competent certifying person or duty manager, stating exactly what is complete and what is not.
  4. Record the open item in the task card and handover record so the status is visible.
  5. Ask for the functional test to be performed and witnessed by an appropriately authorised person before release.

Refusing is not insubordination; it is the correct exercise of a licensed responsibility. Signing under pressure would transfer an unverified risk to the flight crew and passengers.

2. Analyse the social-psychological pressures in this situation and explain why "we all do it" is a dangerous argument.

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Pressures at work:

  • Peer pressure and group norms: the team leader presents non-compliance as normal practice, which makes refusal feel like breaking with the team.
  • Authority gradient: a team leader and an experienced engineer are asking; a five-month authorisation holder is junior and may fear damaging his position.
  • Production pressure and time constraints: 14 people waiting and a three-hour deadline create a strong pull toward the path of least resistance.
  • Diffusion of responsibility: "get it signed by whoever is around" spreads accountability so that no one feels personally responsible.

"We all do it" is dangerous because it normalises a deviation rather than justifying it. A practice being common does not make it compliant or safe; it means the unsafe practice has become the local standard, which is exactly how latent organisational failures grow. It also shifts the basis of the decision from evidence (was the test done?) to social conformity (will I be accepted?). In a just culture, the correct response is to challenge the norm and report it, because normalised deviation is a system hazard, not a private choice.

3. What should happen after the event, at individual, team and organisational level?

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Individual level

  • The technician should be supported for refusing and should not be penalised; his concern should be recorded.
  • The certifying engineer and team leader should be spoken to about the limits of their authorisation and the pressure applied.

Team level

  • A team briefing should restate that certification requires personal verification and that anyone may stop the task.
  • The specific aircraft status (rigging pin, functional test) must be resolved and documented before release.

Organisational level

  • A just-culture investigation should separate the individual's refusal (good) from the pressure to deviate (a system problem).
  • The scheduling and staffing that produced the pressure – an engineer leaving early with no handover of certification responsibility – should be reviewed.
  • A confidential reporting route should be reinforced so that normalised deviations can be raised without fear.
  • Training should cover authority gradients, assertiveness and the meaning of "we all do it".

The reasoning is that the refusal solves one aircraft; only the organisational response prevents the same pressure from producing a signature on the next aircraft.