Closing a trilogue file before the presidency ends
Country X holds the rotating Council presidency and wants to close the 'Interoperability of Public Registries' regulation before its term ends in six weeks. The file has had two trilogues. The European Parliament insists on mandatory public access to beneficial ownership data and an independent supervisory board. In Council, 11 member states with large registries oppose public access, 8 support the Parliament, and 6 are undecided; the file requires qualified majority. The Commission warns that a narrowed scope would undermine the single market objective. The presidency has drafted a compromise that makes public access optional for three years and replaces the supervisory board with a Commission expert group. Two member states say they will vote against unless their national constitutional safeguards are recognised.
1. How should the presidency assess whether the draft compromise can reach qualified majority in Council and agreement with Parliament?
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Council arithmetic: Qualified majority requires 55% of member states (15 of 27) representing 65% of the EU population. On the stated positions, the presidency has 8 clear supporters and 11 opponents; the 6 undecided are decisive. The presidency should map each undecided member state's stated concerns, population weight and room for movement, not simply count heads.
Coalition logic: The compromise must either split the 11 opponents (for example by offering longer transition periods or narrower access categories) or attract enough undecided states. The two constitutional-safeguard states are potential swing votes; their concerns can be met through a safeguard clause without changing the file's core.
Parliament logic: The Parliament's two demands are public access and an independent board. Making access optional for three years directly contradicts the first; replacing the board with a Commission expert group weakens the second. The presidency should test whether the Parliament will accept a deferred mandatory access with a review clause, and whether an expert group with independent members and reporting duties can be presented as equivalent.
Conclusion: The draft is not yet a credible bridge. It risks losing both Council votes and the Parliament. The presidency should build a smaller package around a firm access commitment with transition safeguards, rather than optionality.
2. Which negotiation tactics are legitimate for the presidency, and which would undermine its role?
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Legitimate:
- Bilateral and confessional meetings to identify real red lines.
- Issue linkage within the file, e.g. pairing access rules with safeguards.
- A revised compromise text with a clear rationale and timeline.
- Asking the Commission for technical clarifications and impact evidence.
- Transparent reporting to Coreper and the working party.
Problematic:
- Presenting a 'take it or leave it' text before positions are tested.
- Side deals that are not recorded in the Council's internal record.
- Using the presidency's agenda power to exclude dissenting states from key discussions.
- Claiming a qualified majority without a recorded vote when the arithmetic is uncertain.
The presidency is an honest broker, not a national advocate. Its credibility depends on showing that all options were fairly assessed. If a deal is not reachable, it should say so and hand over a clear state of play rather than force a bad vote.
3. What are the risks of the 'optional public access' and 'Commission expert group' elements from a better-regulation perspective?
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Optional access:
- Fragmentation: 27 different access regimes undermine the single-market objective the Commission has flagged.
- Legal uncertainty for businesses and citizens.
- Difficulty measuring whether the policy works, because there is no common baseline.
- A three-year option may become permanent through inertia.
Expert group:
- An expert group is not the same as an independent supervisory board; it may lack decision-making power, budget and accountability.
- Risk of confusing advisory coordination with enforcement.
Better-regulation response: The presidency should ask for the Commission's assessment of the impacts of optionality, a clear review clause with measurable indicators, and a governance design that specifies powers, independence and reporting. If the evidence is not available, the file should not be closed on a speculative compromise. A short delay with a better text is preferable to a fragile regulation that will need early revision.