eWPTX study materials
eWPTX study resources

eWPTX cheat sheet

eWPTX · Keep the key ideas within reach.

Quick reference

Advanced Web Application Penetration Testing

  • SQL injection UNION extraction requires matching column count and compatible data types; determine count with ORDER BY incrementing until error, or NULL-padding.

  • Boolean-based blind SQLi differs from time-based: the former infers truth from response content/length changes, the latter from deliberate delay functions (SLEEP, pg_sleep, WAITFOR DELAY).

  • Second-order SQL injection stores the payload in the database and triggers it on a later query; input validation at the entry point does not protect the sink.

  • NoSQL injection operators ($ne, $gt, $regex, $where) can bypass authentication when user input is passed unsanitized into query objects; test with JSON bodies, not just query strings.

  • Server-Side Template Injection is confirmed by injecting arithmetic like {{77}} and observing 49; engine fingerprinting proceeds via distinct syntax (${77}, <%= 77 %>, #{77}).

  • Command injection blind detection uses out-of-band channels (DNS/HTTP callbacks) or time delays; semicolon, pipe, backtick, and $() are common separators.

  • XXE requires an XML parser with external entity resolution enabled; test with a DOCTYPE declaring an entity pointing to file:///etc/passwd or an external DTD for OOB exfiltration.

  • Deserialization flaws (Java, PHP, Python pickle, .NET) allow gadget-chain RCE; identify magic methods (__wakeup, readObject) and known library gadget chains.

  • SSRF is validated by pointing the server at an internal address (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254) or a collaborator listener; filter bypasses include decimal/octal IP encodings and DNS rebinding.

Quick reference

Real-World Pentesting Simulation

  • Engagement scoping defines in-scope hosts, testing windows, and prohibited actions (e.g., DoS, social engineering); out-of-scope discoveries are documented, not exploited.

  • Rules of engagement should specify emergency stop contact, data handling for exfiltrated evidence, and whether production data may be accessed.

  • Reconnaissance order: passive OSINT (certificate transparency, DNS records, Shodan) precedes active scanning to minimize detection and footprint.

  • Findings are rated by likelihood and impact (CVSS as a reference, not a verdict); business context can raise or lower severity above the raw score.

  • Proof-of-concept evidence should demonstrate the minimum impact needed to prove the finding (e.g., read one file, not the whole database).

  • A retest verifies remediation of reported findings; unchanged findings are re-reported with updated evidence and status.

  • Chain-of-custody and timestamped logs of every action support the report's credibility and any later legal or audit use.

  • Reporting structure: executive summary (risk in business terms), technical findings (reproduction steps, evidence, remediation), and appendices (tool output, scope).

  • Cleanup after testing includes removing uploaded webshells, test accounts, and scheduled tasks, and confirming the target is in its original state.