ExtremeControl Certified Professional cheat sheet
ExtremeControl Certified Professional · Keep the key ideas within reach.
ExtremeControl roles, authentication and policy decisions
Management, access decisions and device enforcement are separate.
MAC identity is weaker evidence than an authenticated secret/certificate workflow.
Ordered rules need effective-result review.
A returned policy must be supported and provisioned on its enforcing device.
ExtremeControl engines, RADIUS and operational diagnosis
RADIUS source recognition, transport and backend identity have distinct dependencies.
No response is different from an Access-Reject and has multiple possible causes.
End-system records need freshness and actual enforcement correlation.
Management backup and engine availability address different continuity requirements.
Identity, access and cryptographic protection
Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.
MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.
RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.
Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.
Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.
Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.
ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.
Network boundaries and protected communication
Internet-facing services belong in a DMZ; data stores sit in a filtered internal zone.
VLANs alone are not a trust boundary - add DAI, private VLANs and 802.1 X.
IPsec AH gives integrity only; ESP adds confidentiality.
IDS is passive and alerts; IPS is inline and blocks.
NAT is not a security control and temporary rules must be removed.
Security operations, monitoring and response
Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.
Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.
Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.
Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.
Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.
Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.
Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.
Continuity, backup and technical recovery
Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.
A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.
A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.
Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.