ATSA study materials
ATSA study resources

ATSA cheat sheet

ATSA · Keep the key ideas within reach.

Quick reference

General Security Concepts

  • CIA triad: Confidentiality (encryption, access control), Integrity (hashing, signatures, MAC), Availability (redundancy, DDoS protection, backups).

  • Non-repudiation requires asymmetric cryptography: a sender signs with their private key and any verifier checks with the public key.

  • AAA model: Authentication proves identity, Authorization grants rights, Accounting logs activity for audit.

  • Least privilege, separation of duties, and defense in depth are control-design principles, not individual controls.

  • Control types: preventive (blocks), detective (identifies), corrective (restores), deterrent (discourages), compensating (substitute), directive (policy).

  • Zero Trust removes implicit trust from the network perimeter; every request is authenticated and authorized based on identity, device posture, and context.

  • Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-3) is one-way and detects modification; it does not provide confidentiality and is not encryption.

  • Symmetric encryption (AES) is fast and used for bulk data; asymmetric (RSA, ECC) is slower and used for key exchange and signatures.

  • Security through obscurity alone is not a control; hiding a service name or port reduces exposure but does not replace authentication or patching.

Quick reference

Network Security

  • OSI layers and controls: L2 MAC filtering/VLANs, L3 ACLs and routing, L4 stateful firewalls and port filtering, L7 WAF/proxy inspection.

  • TCP three-way handshake is SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; a SYN flood exhausts the half-open connection table and is mitigated with SYN cookies or rate limiting.

  • Stateful firewalls track connection state; stateless ACLs must permit return traffic explicitly.

  • NAT/PAT translates private addresses to a public address and port; it is not a security control by itself.

  • TLS 1.2/1.3 provides confidentiality, integrity, and server authentication; certificate validation checks chain, hostname, expiry, and revocation.

  • IPsec modes: transport encrypts payload only; tunnel encrypts the whole packet and is used for site-to-site VPNs.

  • VLAN hopping via double tagging or switch spoofing is mitigated by disabling unused ports, using a dedicated native VLAN, and enabling DTP/trunk hardening.

  • IDS detects and alerts (passive); IPS detects and blocks inline (active); both may be signature- or anomaly-based.

  • Segmentation (DMZ, microsegmentation) limits lateral movement; a DMZ hosts internet-facing services isolated from the internal network.

Quick reference

Security Operations and Monitoring

  • Log source categories: network (firewall, IDS/IPS, NetFlow), host (EDR, Sysmon, OS audit), application, identity (AD, IdP), and cloud (CloudTrail, activity logs).

  • NIST SP 800-92 log management lifecycle: generation, transmission, storage, analysis, disposal; retain per legal and investigative needs.

  • Syslog severity 0 (emergency) through 7 (debug); lower number equals higher severity.

  • SIEM correlates and normalizes logs, applies correlation rules, and supports alerting; SOAR automates response playbooks.

  • Time synchronization (NTP) is required for correlation; unsynchronized clocks break timeline reconstruction.

  • Detection tuning metrics: false positive rate, false negative rate, mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond (MTTR).

  • Honeypots/honeynets are deception controls that provide low-noise detection and threat intelligence, not primary prevention.

  • Baseline deviation and anomaly detection are effective for unknown threats but produce higher false positives than deterministic signatures.

Quick reference

Vulnerability Management

  • CVSS v3.1 base score components: Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, Scope, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.

  • CVSS severity bands: 0.0 None, 0.1-3.9 Low, 4.0-6.9 Medium, 7.0-8.9 High, 9.0-10.0 Critical.

  • Prioritization combines CVSS with exploitability (EPSS), known exploitation (CISA KEV), asset criticality, and exposure.

  • Vulnerability scanning is authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated; credentialed scans find far more host-level issues.

  • A false positive is a reported vulnerability that does not exist; a false negative is a missed real vulnerability.

  • CVE identifies a specific vulnerability; CWE classifies weakness types; NVD enriches CVEs with CVSS and CPE data.

  • Patch management cycle: inventory, assess, test, deploy, verify, and document exceptions with compensating controls.

  • A vulnerability is a weakness; a threat is an actor or event that could exploit it; risk is the combination of likelihood and impact.

  • Scan results must be validated before remediation to avoid chasing false positives and to confirm exploit conditions.

Quick reference

Incident Response and Threat Hunting

  • NIST IR lifecycle: Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity.

  • Incident response plan elements: roles, communication paths, escalation criteria, evidence handling, and legal/regulatory notification triggers.

  • Order of volatility: CPU registers/cache, RAM, swap, network connections, running processes, disk, backups, archived media.

  • Evidence handling requires chain of custody, hashing at acquisition, write blockers, and documented handoffs.

  • Containment options: isolate host from network, disable account, block IOC at perimeter, revoke tokens; choose based on blast radius.

  • Threat hunting hypothesis-driven approach: form hypothesis from TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK), query telemetry, validate, then convert findings into detections.

  • MITRE ATT&CK tactics describe adversary goals (e.g., Initial Access, Persistence, Lateral Movement); techniques describe how.

  • Indicators of compromise (hashes, IPs, domains) are low-fidelity and short-lived; TTPs are higher-fidelity and more durable.

  • Post-incident review produces lessons learned, root cause, and detection/control improvements; it is not a blame exercise.

Quick reference

Security Architecture and Engineering

  • Secure design principles: least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least common mechanism.

  • Threat modeling frameworks: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) and PASTA.

  • Trust boundaries are drawn where data crosses between components with different privilege or ownership; threats concentrate there.

  • Defense in depth layers controls so a single failure does not compromise the asset.

  • Cryptographic key management: generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, destruction; key compromise defeats the algorithm.

  • HSM/TPM provide hardware-protected key storage; TPM supports measured boot and platform integrity attestation.

  • Cloud shared responsibility: provider secures the cloud (physical, hypervisor); customer secures what is in the cloud (data, identity, config).

  • Secure boot verifies bootloader/kernel signatures; measured boot records hashes to a TPM for later attestation.

  • Fail-open vs fail-closed: fail-closed denies access on failure (safer for security); fail-open preserves availability but may expose the asset.

Quick reference

Identity and Access Management

  • Authentication factors: something you know, something you have, something you are; MFA requires two or more different factor types.

  • Access control models: DAC (owner discretion), MAC (labels/clearances), RBAC (roles), ABAC (attributes/policy), RuBAC (rules).

  • SAML is XML-based SSO for web; OAuth 2.0 is delegated authorization, not authentication; OIDC adds an identity layer on OAuth 2.0.

  • Password storage requires a salted, slow hash (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2); plain SHA-256 is unsuitable for passwords.

  • Kerberos uses a KDC, TGT, and service tickets; it provides mutual authentication and is time-sensitive (default clock skew 5 minutes).

  • Privileged access management: just-in-time elevation, session recording, vaulting of credentials, and removal of standing admin rights.

  • Federation establishes trust between identity providers and service providers, enabling cross-domain SSO without shared passwords.

  • Account lifecycle: provisioning, periodic access review/recertification, role change, and timely deprovisioning on termination.

  • Directory services (LDAP, Active Directory) centralize identity; LDAP is a protocol, AD is a directory service implementation.

Quick reference

Risk Management and Compliance

  • Risk = likelihood x impact; qualitative (high/medium/low), quantitative (SLE, ARO, ALE), and semi-quantitative methods.

  • SLE = asset value x exposure factor; ALE = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).

  • Risk responses: mitigate, transfer (insurance), avoid, accept; residual risk is what remains after treatment.

  • Risk register records asset, threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment, and status.

  • Qualitative vs quantitative: qualitative is faster and subjective; quantitative is numeric and requires reliable data.

  • Business impact analysis (BIA) identifies critical processes and derives RTO and RPO; MTD is the maximum tolerable downtime.

  • RTO is the target restore time; RPO is the maximum acceptable data loss measured in time.

  • Frameworks: NIST CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Govern), ISO 27001 (ISMS), SOC 2 (trust services criteria).

  • Compliance is adherence to requirements; it does not guarantee security, and a control gap is not automatically a breach.

Quick reference

General Security Concepts

  • CIA triad: Confidentiality (encryption, access control), Integrity (hashing, signatures, MAC), Availability (redundancy, DDoS protection, backups).

  • Non-repudiation requires asymmetric cryptography: a sender signs with their private key and any verifier checks with the public key.

  • AAA model: Authentication proves identity, Authorization grants rights, Accounting logs activity for audit.

  • Least privilege, separation of duties, and defense in depth are control-design principles, not individual controls.

  • Control types: preventive (blocks), detective (identifies), corrective (restores), deterrent (discourages), compensating (substitute), directive (policy).

  • Zero Trust removes implicit trust from the network perimeter; every request is authenticated and authorized based on identity, device posture, and context.

  • Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-3) is one-way and detects modification; it does not provide confidentiality and is not encryption.

  • Symmetric encryption (AES) is fast and used for bulk data; asymmetric (RSA, ECC) is slower and used for key exchange and signatures.

  • Security through obscurity alone is not a control; hiding a service name or port reduces exposure but does not replace authentication or patching.

Quick reference

Network Security

  • OSI layers and controls: L2 MAC filtering/VLANs, L3 ACLs and routing, L4 stateful firewalls and port filtering, L7 WAF/proxy inspection.

  • TCP three-way handshake is SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; a SYN flood exhausts the half-open connection table and is mitigated with SYN cookies or rate limiting.

  • Stateful firewalls track connection state; stateless ACLs must permit return traffic explicitly.

  • NAT/PAT translates private addresses to a public address and port; it is not a security control by itself.

  • TLS 1.2/1.3 provides confidentiality, integrity, and server authentication; certificate validation checks chain, hostname, expiry, and revocation.

  • IPsec modes: transport encrypts payload only; tunnel encrypts the whole packet and is used for site-to-site VPNs.

  • VLAN hopping via double tagging or switch spoofing is mitigated by disabling unused ports, using a dedicated native VLAN, and enabling DTP/trunk hardening.

  • IDS detects and alerts (passive); IPS detects and blocks inline (active); both may be signature- or anomaly-based.

  • Segmentation (DMZ, microsegmentation) limits lateral movement; a DMZ hosts internet-facing services isolated from the internal network.

Quick reference

Security Operations and Monitoring

  • Log source categories: network (firewall, IDS/IPS, NetFlow), host (EDR, Sysmon, OS audit), application, identity (AD, IdP), and cloud (CloudTrail, activity logs).

  • NIST SP 800-92 log management lifecycle: generation, transmission, storage, analysis, disposal; retain per legal and investigative needs.

  • Syslog severity 0 (emergency) through 7 (debug); lower number equals higher severity.

  • SIEM correlates and normalizes logs, applies correlation rules, and supports alerting; SOAR automates response playbooks.

  • Time synchronization (NTP) is required for correlation; unsynchronized clocks break timeline reconstruction.

  • Detection tuning metrics: false positive rate, false negative rate, mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond (MTTR).

  • Honeypots/honeynets are deception controls that provide low-noise detection and threat intelligence, not primary prevention.

  • Baseline deviation and anomaly detection are effective for unknown threats but produce higher false positives than deterministic signatures.

Quick reference

Vulnerability Management

  • CVSS v3.1 base score components: Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, Scope, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.

  • CVSS severity bands: 0.0 None, 0.1-3.9 Low, 4.0-6.9 Medium, 7.0-8.9 High, 9.0-10.0 Critical.

  • Prioritization combines CVSS with exploitability (EPSS), known exploitation (CISA KEV), asset criticality, and exposure.

  • Vulnerability scanning is authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated; credentialed scans find far more host-level issues.

  • A false positive is a reported vulnerability that does not exist; a false negative is a missed real vulnerability.

  • CVE identifies a specific vulnerability; CWE classifies weakness types; NVD enriches CVEs with CVSS and CPE data.

  • Patch management cycle: inventory, assess, test, deploy, verify, and document exceptions with compensating controls.

  • A vulnerability is a weakness; a threat is an actor or event that could exploit it; risk is the combination of likelihood and impact.

  • Scan results must be validated before remediation to avoid chasing false positives and to confirm exploit conditions.

Quick reference

Incident Response and Threat Hunting

  • NIST IR lifecycle: Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity.

  • Incident response plan elements: roles, communication paths, escalation criteria, evidence handling, and legal/regulatory notification triggers.

  • Order of volatility: CPU registers/cache, RAM, swap, network connections, running processes, disk, backups, archived media.

  • Evidence handling requires chain of custody, hashing at acquisition, write blockers, and documented handoffs.

  • Containment options: isolate host from network, disable account, block IOC at perimeter, revoke tokens; choose based on blast radius.

  • Threat hunting hypothesis-driven approach: form hypothesis from TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK), query telemetry, validate, then convert findings into detections.

  • MITRE ATT&CK tactics describe adversary goals (e.g., Initial Access, Persistence, Lateral Movement); techniques describe how.

  • Indicators of compromise (hashes, IPs, domains) are low-fidelity and short-lived; TTPs are higher-fidelity and more durable.

  • Post-incident review produces lessons learned, root cause, and detection/control improvements; it is not a blame exercise.

Quick reference

Security Architecture and Engineering

  • Secure design principles: least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least common mechanism.

  • Threat modeling frameworks: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) and PASTA.

  • Trust boundaries are drawn where data crosses between components with different privilege or ownership; threats concentrate there.

  • Defense in depth layers controls so a single failure does not compromise the asset.

  • Cryptographic key management: generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, destruction; key compromise defeats the algorithm.

  • HSM/TPM provide hardware-protected key storage; TPM supports measured boot and platform integrity attestation.

  • Cloud shared responsibility: provider secures the cloud (physical, hypervisor); customer secures what is in the cloud (data, identity, config).

  • Secure boot verifies bootloader/kernel signatures; measured boot records hashes to a TPM for later attestation.

  • Fail-open vs fail-closed: fail-closed denies access on failure (safer for security); fail-open preserves availability but may expose the asset.

Quick reference

Identity and Access Management

  • Authentication factors: something you know, something you have, something you are; MFA requires two or more different factor types.

  • Access control models: DAC (owner discretion), MAC (labels/clearances), RBAC (roles), ABAC (attributes/policy), RuBAC (rules).

  • SAML is XML-based SSO for web; OAuth 2.0 is delegated authorization, not authentication; OIDC adds an identity layer on OAuth 2.0.

  • Password storage requires a salted, slow hash (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2); plain SHA-256 is unsuitable for passwords.

  • Kerberos uses a KDC, TGT, and service tickets; it provides mutual authentication and is time-sensitive (default clock skew 5 minutes).

  • Privileged access management: just-in-time elevation, session recording, vaulting of credentials, and removal of standing admin rights.

  • Federation establishes trust between identity providers and service providers, enabling cross-domain SSO without shared passwords.

  • Account lifecycle: provisioning, periodic access review/recertification, role change, and timely deprovisioning on termination.

  • Directory services (LDAP, Active Directory) centralize identity; LDAP is a protocol, AD is a directory service implementation.

Quick reference

Risk Management and Compliance

  • Risk = likelihood x impact; qualitative (high/medium/low), quantitative (SLE, ARO, ALE), and semi-quantitative methods.

  • SLE = asset value x exposure factor; ALE = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).

  • Risk responses: mitigate, transfer (insurance), avoid, accept; residual risk is what remains after treatment.

  • Risk register records asset, threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment, and status.

  • Qualitative vs quantitative: qualitative is faster and subjective; quantitative is numeric and requires reliable data.

  • Business impact analysis (BIA) identifies critical processes and derives RTO and RPO; MTD is the maximum tolerable downtime.

  • RTO is the target restore time; RPO is the maximum acceptable data loss measured in time.

  • Frameworks: NIST CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Govern), ISO 27001 (ISMS), SOC 2 (trust services criteria).

  • Compliance is adherence to requirements; it does not guarantee security, and a control gap is not automatically a breach.

Quick reference

General Security Concepts

  • CIA triad: Confidentiality (encryption, access control), Integrity (hashing, signatures, MAC), Availability (redundancy, DDoS protection, backups).

  • Non-repudiation requires asymmetric cryptography: a sender signs with their private key and any verifier checks with the public key.

  • AAA model: Authentication proves identity, Authorization grants rights, Accounting logs activity for audit.

  • Least privilege, separation of duties, and defense in depth are control-design principles, not individual controls.

  • Control types: preventive (blocks), detective (identifies), corrective (restores), deterrent (discourages), compensating (substitute), directive (policy).

  • Zero Trust removes implicit trust from the network perimeter; every request is authenticated and authorized based on identity, device posture, and context.

  • Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-3) is one-way and detects modification; it does not provide confidentiality and is not encryption.

  • Symmetric encryption (AES) is fast and used for bulk data; asymmetric (RSA, ECC) is slower and used for key exchange and signatures.

  • Security through obscurity alone is not a control; hiding a service name or port reduces exposure but does not replace authentication or patching.

Quick reference

Network Security

  • OSI layers and controls: L2 MAC filtering/VLANs, L3 ACLs and routing, L4 stateful firewalls and port filtering, L7 WAF/proxy inspection.

  • TCP three-way handshake is SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; a SYN flood exhausts the half-open connection table and is mitigated with SYN cookies or rate limiting.

  • Stateful firewalls track connection state; stateless ACLs must permit return traffic explicitly.

  • NAT/PAT translates private addresses to a public address and port; it is not a security control by itself.

  • TLS 1.2/1.3 provides confidentiality, integrity, and server authentication; certificate validation checks chain, hostname, expiry, and revocation.

  • IPsec modes: transport encrypts payload only; tunnel encrypts the whole packet and is used for site-to-site VPNs.

  • VLAN hopping via double tagging or switch spoofing is mitigated by disabling unused ports, using a dedicated native VLAN, and enabling DTP/trunk hardening.

  • IDS detects and alerts (passive); IPS detects and blocks inline (active); both may be signature- or anomaly-based.

  • Segmentation (DMZ, microsegmentation) limits lateral movement; a DMZ hosts internet-facing services isolated from the internal network.

Quick reference

Security Operations and Monitoring

  • Log source categories: network (firewall, IDS/IPS, NetFlow), host (EDR, Sysmon, OS audit), application, identity (AD, IdP), and cloud (CloudTrail, activity logs).

  • NIST SP 800-92 log management lifecycle: generation, transmission, storage, analysis, disposal; retain per legal and investigative needs.

  • Syslog severity 0 (emergency) through 7 (debug); lower number equals higher severity.

  • SIEM correlates and normalizes logs, applies correlation rules, and supports alerting; SOAR automates response playbooks.

  • Time synchronization (NTP) is required for correlation; unsynchronized clocks break timeline reconstruction.

  • Detection tuning metrics: false positive rate, false negative rate, mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond (MTTR).

  • Honeypots/honeynets are deception controls that provide low-noise detection and threat intelligence, not primary prevention.

  • Baseline deviation and anomaly detection are effective for unknown threats but produce higher false positives than deterministic signatures.

Quick reference

Vulnerability Management

  • CVSS v3.1 base score components: Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, Scope, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.

  • CVSS severity bands: 0.0 None, 0.1-3.9 Low, 4.0-6.9 Medium, 7.0-8.9 High, 9.0-10.0 Critical.

  • Prioritization combines CVSS with exploitability (EPSS), known exploitation (CISA KEV), asset criticality, and exposure.

  • Vulnerability scanning is authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated; credentialed scans find far more host-level issues.

  • A false positive is a reported vulnerability that does not exist; a false negative is a missed real vulnerability.

  • CVE identifies a specific vulnerability; CWE classifies weakness types; NVD enriches CVEs with CVSS and CPE data.

  • Patch management cycle: inventory, assess, test, deploy, verify, and document exceptions with compensating controls.

  • A vulnerability is a weakness; a threat is an actor or event that could exploit it; risk is the combination of likelihood and impact.

  • Scan results must be validated before remediation to avoid chasing false positives and to confirm exploit conditions.

Quick reference

Incident Response and Threat Hunting

  • NIST IR lifecycle: Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity.

  • Incident response plan elements: roles, communication paths, escalation criteria, evidence handling, and legal/regulatory notification triggers.

  • Order of volatility: CPU registers/cache, RAM, swap, network connections, running processes, disk, backups, archived media.

  • Evidence handling requires chain of custody, hashing at acquisition, write blockers, and documented handoffs.

  • Containment options: isolate host from network, disable account, block IOC at perimeter, revoke tokens; choose based on blast radius.

  • Threat hunting hypothesis-driven approach: form hypothesis from TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK), query telemetry, validate, then convert findings into detections.

  • MITRE ATT&CK tactics describe adversary goals (e.g., Initial Access, Persistence, Lateral Movement); techniques describe how.

  • Indicators of compromise (hashes, IPs, domains) are low-fidelity and short-lived; TTPs are higher-fidelity and more durable.

  • Post-incident review produces lessons learned, root cause, and detection/control improvements; it is not a blame exercise.

Quick reference

Security Architecture and Engineering

  • Secure design principles: least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least common mechanism.

  • Threat modeling frameworks: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) and PASTA.

  • Trust boundaries are drawn where data crosses between components with different privilege or ownership; threats concentrate there.

  • Defense in depth layers controls so a single failure does not compromise the asset.

  • Cryptographic key management: generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, destruction; key compromise defeats the algorithm.

  • HSM/TPM provide hardware-protected key storage; TPM supports measured boot and platform integrity attestation.

  • Cloud shared responsibility: provider secures the cloud (physical, hypervisor); customer secures what is in the cloud (data, identity, config).

  • Secure boot verifies bootloader/kernel signatures; measured boot records hashes to a TPM for later attestation.

  • Fail-open vs fail-closed: fail-closed denies access on failure (safer for security); fail-open preserves availability but may expose the asset.

Quick reference

Identity and Access Management

  • Authentication factors: something you know, something you have, something you are; MFA requires two or more different factor types.

  • Access control models: DAC (owner discretion), MAC (labels/clearances), RBAC (roles), ABAC (attributes/policy), RuBAC (rules).

  • SAML is XML-based SSO for web; OAuth 2.0 is delegated authorization, not authentication; OIDC adds an identity layer on OAuth 2.0.

  • Password storage requires a salted, slow hash (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2); plain SHA-256 is unsuitable for passwords.

  • Kerberos uses a KDC, TGT, and service tickets; it provides mutual authentication and is time-sensitive (default clock skew 5 minutes).

  • Privileged access management: just-in-time elevation, session recording, vaulting of credentials, and removal of standing admin rights.

  • Federation establishes trust between identity providers and service providers, enabling cross-domain SSO without shared passwords.

  • Account lifecycle: provisioning, periodic access review/recertification, role change, and timely deprovisioning on termination.

  • Directory services (LDAP, Active Directory) centralize identity; LDAP is a protocol, AD is a directory service implementation.

Quick reference

Risk Management and Compliance

  • Risk = likelihood x impact; qualitative (high/medium/low), quantitative (SLE, ARO, ALE), and semi-quantitative methods.

  • SLE = asset value x exposure factor; ALE = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).

  • Risk responses: mitigate, transfer (insurance), avoid, accept; residual risk is what remains after treatment.

  • Risk register records asset, threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment, and status.

  • Qualitative vs quantitative: qualitative is faster and subjective; quantitative is numeric and requires reliable data.

  • Business impact analysis (BIA) identifies critical processes and derives RTO and RPO; MTD is the maximum tolerable downtime.

  • RTO is the target restore time; RPO is the maximum acceptable data loss measured in time.

  • Frameworks: NIST CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Govern), ISO 27001 (ISMS), SOC 2 (trust services criteria).

  • Compliance is adherence to requirements; it does not guarantee security, and a control gap is not automatically a breach.

Quick reference

General Security Concepts

  • CIA triad: Confidentiality (encryption, access control), Integrity (hashing, signatures, MAC), Availability (redundancy, DDoS protection, backups).

  • Non-repudiation requires asymmetric cryptography: a sender signs with their private key and any verifier checks with the public key.

  • AAA model: Authentication proves identity, Authorization grants rights, Accounting logs activity for audit.

  • Least privilege, separation of duties, and defense in depth are control-design principles, not individual controls.

  • Control types: preventive (blocks), detective (identifies), corrective (restores), deterrent (discourages), compensating (substitute), directive (policy).

  • Zero Trust removes implicit trust from the network perimeter; every request is authenticated and authorized based on identity, device posture, and context.

  • Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-3) is one-way and detects modification; it does not provide confidentiality and is not encryption.

  • Symmetric encryption (AES) is fast and used for bulk data; asymmetric (RSA, ECC) is slower and used for key exchange and signatures.

  • Security through obscurity alone is not a control; hiding a service name or port reduces exposure but does not replace authentication or patching.

Quick reference

Network Security

  • OSI layers and controls: L2 MAC filtering/VLANs, L3 ACLs and routing, L4 stateful firewalls and port filtering, L7 WAF/proxy inspection.

  • TCP three-way handshake is SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; a SYN flood exhausts the half-open connection table and is mitigated with SYN cookies or rate limiting.

  • Stateful firewalls track connection state; stateless ACLs must permit return traffic explicitly.

  • NAT/PAT translates private addresses to a public address and port; it is not a security control by itself.

  • TLS 1.2/1.3 provides confidentiality, integrity, and server authentication; certificate validation checks chain, hostname, expiry, and revocation.

  • IPsec modes: transport encrypts payload only; tunnel encrypts the whole packet and is used for site-to-site VPNs.

  • VLAN hopping via double tagging or switch spoofing is mitigated by disabling unused ports, using a dedicated native VLAN, and enabling DTP/trunk hardening.

  • IDS detects and alerts (passive); IPS detects and blocks inline (active); both may be signature- or anomaly-based.

  • Segmentation (DMZ, microsegmentation) limits lateral movement; a DMZ hosts internet-facing services isolated from the internal network.

Quick reference

Security Operations and Monitoring

  • Log source categories: network (firewall, IDS/IPS, NetFlow), host (EDR, Sysmon, OS audit), application, identity (AD, IdP), and cloud (CloudTrail, activity logs).

  • NIST SP 800-92 log management lifecycle: generation, transmission, storage, analysis, disposal; retain per legal and investigative needs.

  • Syslog severity 0 (emergency) through 7 (debug); lower number equals higher severity.

  • SIEM correlates and normalizes logs, applies correlation rules, and supports alerting; SOAR automates response playbooks.

  • Time synchronization (NTP) is required for correlation; unsynchronized clocks break timeline reconstruction.

  • Detection tuning metrics: false positive rate, false negative rate, mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond (MTTR).

  • Honeypots/honeynets are deception controls that provide low-noise detection and threat intelligence, not primary prevention.

  • Baseline deviation and anomaly detection are effective for unknown threats but produce higher false positives than deterministic signatures.

Quick reference

Vulnerability Management

  • CVSS v3.1 base score components: Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, Scope, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.

  • CVSS severity bands: 0.0 None, 0.1-3.9 Low, 4.0-6.9 Medium, 7.0-8.9 High, 9.0-10.0 Critical.

  • Prioritization combines CVSS with exploitability (EPSS), known exploitation (CISA KEV), asset criticality, and exposure.

  • Vulnerability scanning is authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated; credentialed scans find far more host-level issues.

  • A false positive is a reported vulnerability that does not exist; a false negative is a missed real vulnerability.

  • CVE identifies a specific vulnerability; CWE classifies weakness types; NVD enriches CVEs with CVSS and CPE data.

  • Patch management cycle: inventory, assess, test, deploy, verify, and document exceptions with compensating controls.

  • A vulnerability is a weakness; a threat is an actor or event that could exploit it; risk is the combination of likelihood and impact.

  • Scan results must be validated before remediation to avoid chasing false positives and to confirm exploit conditions.

Quick reference

Incident Response and Threat Hunting

  • NIST IR lifecycle: Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity.

  • Incident response plan elements: roles, communication paths, escalation criteria, evidence handling, and legal/regulatory notification triggers.

  • Order of volatility: CPU registers/cache, RAM, swap, network connections, running processes, disk, backups, archived media.

  • Evidence handling requires chain of custody, hashing at acquisition, write blockers, and documented handoffs.

  • Containment options: isolate host from network, disable account, block IOC at perimeter, revoke tokens; choose based on blast radius.

  • Threat hunting hypothesis-driven approach: form hypothesis from TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK), query telemetry, validate, then convert findings into detections.

  • MITRE ATT&CK tactics describe adversary goals (e.g., Initial Access, Persistence, Lateral Movement); techniques describe how.

  • Indicators of compromise (hashes, IPs, domains) are low-fidelity and short-lived; TTPs are higher-fidelity and more durable.

  • Post-incident review produces lessons learned, root cause, and detection/control improvements; it is not a blame exercise.

Quick reference

Security Architecture and Engineering

  • Secure design principles: least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least common mechanism.

  • Threat modeling frameworks: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) and PASTA.

  • Trust boundaries are drawn where data crosses between components with different privilege or ownership; threats concentrate there.

  • Defense in depth layers controls so a single failure does not compromise the asset.

  • Cryptographic key management: generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, destruction; key compromise defeats the algorithm.

  • HSM/TPM provide hardware-protected key storage; TPM supports measured boot and platform integrity attestation.

  • Cloud shared responsibility: provider secures the cloud (physical, hypervisor); customer secures what is in the cloud (data, identity, config).

  • Secure boot verifies bootloader/kernel signatures; measured boot records hashes to a TPM for later attestation.

  • Fail-open vs fail-closed: fail-closed denies access on failure (safer for security); fail-open preserves availability but may expose the asset.

Quick reference

Identity and Access Management

  • Authentication factors: something you know, something you have, something you are; MFA requires two or more different factor types.

  • Access control models: DAC (owner discretion), MAC (labels/clearances), RBAC (roles), ABAC (attributes/policy), RuBAC (rules).

  • SAML is XML-based SSO for web; OAuth 2.0 is delegated authorization, not authentication; OIDC adds an identity layer on OAuth 2.0.

  • Password storage requires a salted, slow hash (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2); plain SHA-256 is unsuitable for passwords.

  • Kerberos uses a KDC, TGT, and service tickets; it provides mutual authentication and is time-sensitive (default clock skew 5 minutes).

  • Privileged access management: just-in-time elevation, session recording, vaulting of credentials, and removal of standing admin rights.

  • Federation establishes trust between identity providers and service providers, enabling cross-domain SSO without shared passwords.

  • Account lifecycle: provisioning, periodic access review/recertification, role change, and timely deprovisioning on termination.

  • Directory services (LDAP, Active Directory) centralize identity; LDAP is a protocol, AD is a directory service implementation.

Quick reference

Risk Management and Compliance

  • Risk = likelihood x impact; qualitative (high/medium/low), quantitative (SLE, ARO, ALE), and semi-quantitative methods.

  • SLE = asset value x exposure factor; ALE = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).

  • Risk responses: mitigate, transfer (insurance), avoid, accept; residual risk is what remains after treatment.

  • Risk register records asset, threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment, and status.

  • Qualitative vs quantitative: qualitative is faster and subjective; quantitative is numeric and requires reliable data.

  • Business impact analysis (BIA) identifies critical processes and derives RTO and RPO; MTD is the maximum tolerable downtime.

  • RTO is the target restore time; RPO is the maximum acceptable data loss measured in time.

  • Frameworks: NIST CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Govern), ISO 27001 (ISMS), SOC 2 (trust services criteria).

  • Compliance is adherence to requirements; it does not guarantee security, and a control gap is not automatically a breach.

Quick reference

General Security Concepts

  • CIA triad: Confidentiality (encryption, access control), Integrity (hashing, signatures, MAC), Availability (redundancy, DDoS protection, backups).

  • Non-repudiation requires asymmetric cryptography: a sender signs with their private key and any verifier checks with the public key.

  • AAA model: Authentication proves identity, Authorization grants rights, Accounting logs activity for audit.

  • Least privilege, separation of duties, and defense in depth are control-design principles, not individual controls.

  • Control types: preventive (blocks), detective (identifies), corrective (restores), deterrent (discourages), compensating (substitute), directive (policy).

  • Zero Trust removes implicit trust from the network perimeter; every request is authenticated and authorized based on identity, device posture, and context.

  • Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-3) is one-way and detects modification; it does not provide confidentiality and is not encryption.

  • Symmetric encryption (AES) is fast and used for bulk data; asymmetric (RSA, ECC) is slower and used for key exchange and signatures.

  • Security through obscurity alone is not a control; hiding a service name or port reduces exposure but does not replace authentication or patching.

Quick reference

Network Security

  • OSI layers and controls: L2 MAC filtering/VLANs, L3 ACLs and routing, L4 stateful firewalls and port filtering, L7 WAF/proxy inspection.

  • TCP three-way handshake is SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; a SYN flood exhausts the half-open connection table and is mitigated with SYN cookies or rate limiting.

  • Stateful firewalls track connection state; stateless ACLs must permit return traffic explicitly.

  • NAT/PAT translates private addresses to a public address and port; it is not a security control by itself.

  • TLS 1.2/1.3 provides confidentiality, integrity, and server authentication; certificate validation checks chain, hostname, expiry, and revocation.

  • IPsec modes: transport encrypts payload only; tunnel encrypts the whole packet and is used for site-to-site VPNs.

  • VLAN hopping via double tagging or switch spoofing is mitigated by disabling unused ports, using a dedicated native VLAN, and enabling DTP/trunk hardening.

  • IDS detects and alerts (passive); IPS detects and blocks inline (active); both may be signature- or anomaly-based.

  • Segmentation (DMZ, microsegmentation) limits lateral movement; a DMZ hosts internet-facing services isolated from the internal network.

Quick reference

Security Operations and Monitoring

  • Log source categories: network (firewall, IDS/IPS, NetFlow), host (EDR, Sysmon, OS audit), application, identity (AD, IdP), and cloud (CloudTrail, activity logs).

  • NIST SP 800-92 log management lifecycle: generation, transmission, storage, analysis, disposal; retain per legal and investigative needs.

  • Syslog severity 0 (emergency) through 7 (debug); lower number equals higher severity.

  • SIEM correlates and normalizes logs, applies correlation rules, and supports alerting; SOAR automates response playbooks.

  • Time synchronization (NTP) is required for correlation; unsynchronized clocks break timeline reconstruction.

  • Detection tuning metrics: false positive rate, false negative rate, mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond (MTTR).

  • Honeypots/honeynets are deception controls that provide low-noise detection and threat intelligence, not primary prevention.

  • Baseline deviation and anomaly detection are effective for unknown threats but produce higher false positives than deterministic signatures.

Quick reference

Vulnerability Management

  • CVSS v3.1 base score components: Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, Scope, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.

  • CVSS severity bands: 0.0 None, 0.1-3.9 Low, 4.0-6.9 Medium, 7.0-8.9 High, 9.0-10.0 Critical.

  • Prioritization combines CVSS with exploitability (EPSS), known exploitation (CISA KEV), asset criticality, and exposure.

  • Vulnerability scanning is authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated; credentialed scans find far more host-level issues.

  • A false positive is a reported vulnerability that does not exist; a false negative is a missed real vulnerability.

  • CVE identifies a specific vulnerability; CWE classifies weakness types; NVD enriches CVEs with CVSS and CPE data.

  • Patch management cycle: inventory, assess, test, deploy, verify, and document exceptions with compensating controls.

  • A vulnerability is a weakness; a threat is an actor or event that could exploit it; risk is the combination of likelihood and impact.

  • Scan results must be validated before remediation to avoid chasing false positives and to confirm exploit conditions.

Quick reference

Incident Response and Threat Hunting

  • NIST IR lifecycle: Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity.

  • Incident response plan elements: roles, communication paths, escalation criteria, evidence handling, and legal/regulatory notification triggers.

  • Order of volatility: CPU registers/cache, RAM, swap, network connections, running processes, disk, backups, archived media.

  • Evidence handling requires chain of custody, hashing at acquisition, write blockers, and documented handoffs.

  • Containment options: isolate host from network, disable account, block IOC at perimeter, revoke tokens; choose based on blast radius.

  • Threat hunting hypothesis-driven approach: form hypothesis from TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK), query telemetry, validate, then convert findings into detections.

  • MITRE ATT&CK tactics describe adversary goals (e.g., Initial Access, Persistence, Lateral Movement); techniques describe how.

  • Indicators of compromise (hashes, IPs, domains) are low-fidelity and short-lived; TTPs are higher-fidelity and more durable.

  • Post-incident review produces lessons learned, root cause, and detection/control improvements; it is not a blame exercise.

Quick reference

Security Architecture and Engineering

  • Secure design principles: least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least common mechanism.

  • Threat modeling frameworks: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) and PASTA.

  • Trust boundaries are drawn where data crosses between components with different privilege or ownership; threats concentrate there.

  • Defense in depth layers controls so a single failure does not compromise the asset.

  • Cryptographic key management: generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, destruction; key compromise defeats the algorithm.

  • HSM/TPM provide hardware-protected key storage; TPM supports measured boot and platform integrity attestation.

  • Cloud shared responsibility: provider secures the cloud (physical, hypervisor); customer secures what is in the cloud (data, identity, config).

  • Secure boot verifies bootloader/kernel signatures; measured boot records hashes to a TPM for later attestation.

  • Fail-open vs fail-closed: fail-closed denies access on failure (safer for security); fail-open preserves availability but may expose the asset.

Quick reference

Identity and Access Management

  • Authentication factors: something you know, something you have, something you are; MFA requires two or more different factor types.

  • Access control models: DAC (owner discretion), MAC (labels/clearances), RBAC (roles), ABAC (attributes/policy), RuBAC (rules).

  • SAML is XML-based SSO for web; OAuth 2.0 is delegated authorization, not authentication; OIDC adds an identity layer on OAuth 2.0.

  • Password storage requires a salted, slow hash (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2); plain SHA-256 is unsuitable for passwords.

  • Kerberos uses a KDC, TGT, and service tickets; it provides mutual authentication and is time-sensitive (default clock skew 5 minutes).

  • Privileged access management: just-in-time elevation, session recording, vaulting of credentials, and removal of standing admin rights.

  • Federation establishes trust between identity providers and service providers, enabling cross-domain SSO without shared passwords.

  • Account lifecycle: provisioning, periodic access review/recertification, role change, and timely deprovisioning on termination.

  • Directory services (LDAP, Active Directory) centralize identity; LDAP is a protocol, AD is a directory service implementation.

Quick reference

Risk Management and Compliance

  • Risk = likelihood x impact; qualitative (high/medium/low), quantitative (SLE, ARO, ALE), and semi-quantitative methods.

  • SLE = asset value x exposure factor; ALE = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).

  • Risk responses: mitigate, transfer (insurance), avoid, accept; residual risk is what remains after treatment.

  • Risk register records asset, threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment, and status.

  • Qualitative vs quantitative: qualitative is faster and subjective; quantitative is numeric and requires reliable data.

  • Business impact analysis (BIA) identifies critical processes and derives RTO and RPO; MTD is the maximum tolerable downtime.

  • RTO is the target restore time; RPO is the maximum acceptable data loss measured in time.

  • Frameworks: NIST CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Govern), ISO 27001 (ISMS), SOC 2 (trust services criteria).

  • Compliance is adherence to requirements; it does not guarantee security, and a control gap is not automatically a breach.